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NOTE
INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY IN THE LIBRARY:
CAN THE PUBLIC LIBRARY EMPLOYER BE LIABLE
FOR THIRD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT WHEN
A CLIENT DISPLAYS INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY
TO STAFF?
INTRODUCTION
On its website, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") provides answers to questions interested parties
might pose regarding public library attempts to restrict ac-
cess to Internet materials of a sexual nature, including the
following:
Q: Would libraries that do not use blocking software be liable for
sexual harassment in the library?
A: No. Workplace sexual harassment laws apply only to employees,
not to patrons. The remote possibility that a library employee might
inadvertently view an objectionable site does not constitute sexual
harassment under current law.1
The ACLU's emphatic assertion that a public library could not
currently be subjected to liability based on staff exposure to
Internet sexual content is likely incorrect. Stated more precise-
ly, it is true under current law that the library may not be
subject to liability only because no case has yet been filed.
1 American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union Freedom
Network, Censorship in a Box (visited Jan. 10, 1999)
<http'/www.aclu.orgrissues/cyber/boxthtml> [hereinafter Censorship in a Box].
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Public library staff exposure to Internet pornography2 is
not all inadvertent or remote. Evidence indicates that public
library staff are being deliberately exiposed to sexually graphic
Internet images by some of their clients and that library poli-
cy, which often requires staff to assist clients with use of the
Internet, is resulting in exposures to sexually graphic images.3
Current sexual harassment law authorizes suits brought by
workers in customer service environments for harassing behav-
ior by a customer toward a worker,4 for employer policies that
2 Courts and legal commentators often refer to sexually explicit materials as
"pornography" without any reference to a legal definition of that term. See, e.g.,
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2337 (1997); Note, Pornography, Equality, and a
Discrimination-Free Workplace: A Comparative Perspective, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1075,
1075 (1993) [hereinafter Discrimination-Free Workplace]. The term is likewise
meant to be merely descriptive in this Note.
' See, e.g., Filtering Facts, Reports of Pornography in Libraries (visited Dec.
20, 1998) <httpi//www.filteringfacts.org.kidlib.html> [hereinafter Reports of Pornog-
raphy] (detailing instance where client repeatedly beckoned staff members for as-
sistance with the Internet and left pornographic images on screen when staff ap-
proached, despite repeated requests to remove such images prior to working with
staff; instances where clients repeatedly sent pornographic print requests to central
printers administered by staff; and instances where clients repeatedly displayed
Internet pornography on terminals visible to staff desks when other terminals
were available). For a complete discussion of such evidence, see infra Part H. The
Filtering Facts website ended its monitoring in late 1999 and now is maintained
only as an archive. See Reports of Pornography, supra. While this Note centers on
liability due to client display of online sexual content, it is likely that, for the
same reasons, client behavior such as engaging a staff member in discussion of
pornography would be actionable, perhaps ever more so since it falls more under
the rubric of traditional harassment behaviors.
' Courts have recognized the viability of so-called third-party sexual harass-
ment claims in at least sixteen cases. Recently, in Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162
F.3d 1062, 1073 (10th Cir. 1998), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
joined its "sister circuits," the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, when it
formally recognized such claims. In Lockard, the court of appeals held that a Pizza
Hut waitress had established a hostile work environment claim against her fran-
chise employer based on two customers "grabbing" her, hair and breast "while she
attempted to take their orders and serve their ... beer." Id. at 1072, 1075. The
waitress had previously asked a manager that she not serve these customers
based on past rude behavior, but was forced by the manager to wait on them
anyway, resulting in the "sexual assault." See id. at 1074-75. The court of appeals
found that the manager had defied Pizza Hut's own policy manual guidelines on
harassment by not asking the customers to desist from aggressive behavior or ask-
ing them to leave prior to forcing the waitress to serve them. See id. The term
"third-party" in the context of a sexual harassment claim is a term of art which
identifies claims brought against an employer for liability based on a worker being
harassed by a customer or client, rather than a co-worker or supervisor. This is
not to be confused with the use of that term in other areas of the law where
"third-party" identifies a claim brought by an additional party other than a victim.
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See, e.g., Amy Mathews, Comment, The Sexual Harassment Revolution, 65 UMKC
L. REV. 977, 990 (1997) (identifying claims involving customer harassment of a
worker as "third-party"); Karen Kaplowitz & Donald P. Harris, Briefi Third Party
Sexual Harassment: Duties and Liabilities of Employers, 26-SPG BRIEF *32, *36
(1997), available in Westlaw.
For other cases in which courts have recognized this claim, see Coates v.
Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999) ("When an employee's
ability to perform his or her job is compromised by... sexual harassment and
the employer knows it, it is the employer that has the ability, and . . . the re-
sponsibility, to address the problem, whether the harasser is a supervisor, a co-
worker, a client, or a subordinate." (emphasis added)); Folkerson v. Circus Enter-
prise, Inc., 107 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing third-party harassment but
granting summary judgment to casino employer where mime employed as living
doll failed to present any facts demonstrating that the casino ratified or acquiesced
in harassment where a casino patron touched the mime as she was performing);
Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of employees subjected to inappropriate sexual conduct by resi-
dents of program for developmentally disabled where they worked); Trent v. Valley
Electric Ass'n, 41 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing employee's prima facie case
of Title VII sex discrimination where she was subjected to sexually offensive re-
marks at a seminar employer required her to attend); Ligenza v. Genesis Health
Ventures, 995 F. Supp. 226, 230-32 (D. Mass. 1998) (recognizing that under "limit-
ed" circumstances "employers can be held liable for sexually charged actions of
non-employees toward employees," but granting summary judgment to nursing
facility employer where patient care employee failed to aprise hospital of offensive-
ness of 69 year-old patient "looking up her blouse," thus failing to establish that
hospital had requisite knowledge, despite widespread awareness in facility that
patient routinely made inappropriate sexual comments to workers and would lie in
his bed naked); Mart v. Dr Pepper Co., 923 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Kan. 1996) (grant-
ing summary judgment to employer defendant only because sales manager
employee's assertion that she had been subjected to vulgar language by manager
of a soft drink bottling company client failed to state a sufficiently severe and
pervasive third-party claim); Hallberg v. Eat'n Park, No. 94-1888, 1996 WL 182212
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1996) (granting summary judgment to restaurant employer
because waitress's assertion of foul-mouthed and crude behavior by customer failed
to state conduct directed toward her with enough specificity to establish sufficient
severity); Menchaca v. Rose Records, Inc., No. 94 C 1376, 1995 WL 151847 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 3, 1995) (denying summary judgment where record store clerk suffered
groping and lewd comments by regular customer); Hernandez v. Miranda Velez,
No. 92-2701, 1994 WL 394855 (D.P.R. July 20, 1994) (denying summary judgment
to store employer where customer made sexual comments and tried to "grab" store
cashier); Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349, 1994 WL 566943 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994)
(denying summary judgment to hospital employer because a doctor's status as an
independent contractor was immaterial pursuant to the EEOC guidelines establish-
ing third-party harassment where the doctor left sex-related articles on hospital
employee nurse's desk, requested that she obtain sexual histories of patients, and
left a lotion-filled condom on her desk); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F.
Supp. 1024, 1026 (D. Nev. 1992) (denying summary judgment to hotel employer
where customers told female casino worker she had "great tits" and a "nice body"
and stared at her); Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.
Va. 1992) (denying summary judgment where employee suffered advances, lewd
1999]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
result in a worker being subjected to harassing conduct,5 and
for a work environment in which a worker is exposed to "dirty
pictures."' Thus, under current law, public library workers7
may be able to prevail on claims against their employers that
their exposure to Internet pornography by clients subjects
them to a hostile work environment.
Since public libraries recently began providing access to
the Internet,' they have been embroiled in legal controversy
comments, and requests to check into a hotel with her from client company's gen-
eral manager); Sparks v. Regional Medical Center Board, 792 F. Supp. 735 (N.D.
Ala. 1992) (holding that the issue of whether an employer could be liable for sexu-
ally harassing conduct due to conduct by a subcontractor against an employee
irrelevant because, under EEOC Guidelines, an employer could be responsible for
acts by third parties in sexual harassment cases); EEOC v. Newtown Inn Associ-
ates, 647 F. Supp. 957, 958 (E.D. Va. 1986) (recognizing Title VII violation where
employer required waitresses "to project an air of sexual availability to customers"
by wearing provocative outfits and flirting and dancing with customers resulting in
sexual proposals and verbal and physical abuse by customers and where employer
reassigned complaining waitresses to less desirable shifts); and EEOC v. Sage
Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding back pay to lobby atten-
dant employee for wrongful discharge where employer required her to wear a
revealing outfit which prompted lewd comments and sexual propositions by pass-
ersby).
6 See Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk De-
fense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 1107, 1112-14 (1995) (discussing imposition of liability on employers for dress
code policies); Mathews, supra note 4, at 992-93 (discussing employer liability
based on 'job requirements," including employer dress codes commonly implicated
in third-party cases because they "draw physical and verbal sexual harassment"
from third parties); Sandra L. Snaden, Note, Baring It All at the Workplace: Who
Bears the Responsibility?, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1225, 1237-48 (1996) (discussing
courts' imposition of liability based on employer dress codes, appearance policies,
and requirement that workers act with an air of sexuality toward customers).
6 See infra notes 137-138, 140-142 and accompanying text.
This Note discusses the viability of a sexual harassment claim due to staff
exposure to Internet pornography only in the context of the public library envi-
ronment. Although private library workers would likely enjoy the same rights to a
claim as workers in public libraries, the specific evidence of an Internet harass-
ment problem is largely emerging from public library discussions of Internet access
in their environments. Also, public libraries present slightly different questions of
claim viability due to their stronger First Amendment responsibilities. A discussion
of private library worker rights and responsibilities is therefore beyond the scope
of this Note.
' As late as 1995, public access to Internet in public libraries was still so
sparse that the "few libraries" offering public access "received flattering, gee-whiz
press coverage." Karen Hyman, Internet Policies: Managing in the Real World, AM.
LIB., Nov. 1997, at 60. By 1999, out of 8,921 total public libraries in the United
States, "60.4% offer Internet access to the public, up from 27.8% in 1996." Ameri-
can Library Association, LARC Fact Sheet-How Many Libraries Are on the
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surrounding public access provided to sexually explicit images
online, especially with respect to minor access.9 As yet, the
bulk of this controversy concerns the exposure of the public to
such images and has resulted in legislative'0 and judicial at-
tempts by private citizens or groups" to impose access restric-
Internet? (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http//www.ala.orglibrary/fact26.html>. Out of the
468 public libraries serving populations of 100,000 or more, 75.3% offer Internet
access "directly to patrons ... ." Id.
' See Scott E. Uhler & Philippe R. Weiss, Liability Issues and the Internet,
ILL. LIaR., Summer 1996, at 117. The authors explain:
The Internet and the potential dangers it poses to minors, are currently
at the center of intense ongoing media and judicial attention. The
Internet is a vast resource ... including materials many may consider
inappropriate. Such materials include pornography, obscenity, sexually
explicit literature and graphic or sexually explicit news groups.
Public and private libraries are advised to remain current on the
latest state and federal statutory and case laws affecting their ability to
offer patrons and employees Internet access and services.
Id.
10 In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") which
contained a provision subjecting public libraries to liability for providing access to
sexually explicit Internet content to minors. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Supp. 1997).
In 1997, in response to a challenge by the ACLU, the Supreme Court invalidated
that provision on the grounds that it was "facially overbroad." Reno v. ACLU, 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
States also have attempted, and sometimes succeeded, in passing legislation
similar to the CDA. See Uhler & Weiss, supra note 9, at 117 (reporting that
"many states have successfully passed laws like the CDA," for example that of
Illinois, that "criminalizes the . . . delivery of obscene writings, pictures and re-
cords," thus subjecting libraries to liability for failure to take "reasonable steps to
protect [library] computer system[s] from unauthorized obscenity or child pornog-
raphy"). New York passed one such statute modeled on the CDA, but it was sub-
sequently invalidated on the grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. See American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
" For example, at least one library has been unsuccessfully sued by a parent
who opposes libraries allowing unrestrained child access to Internet sexual content
after her child downloaded some pornography at a local California branch. See
Beverly Goldberg, Censorship Watch: Court Dismisses Livermore Suit, AM. LIBR.,
Dec. 1, 1998, at 17. The plaintiff in that case has since filed an appeal. See News
Briefs for March 22, 1999: Livermore Plaintiffs File Appeal in Mandated Filtering
Quest, AM. LIR. ONLINE 3 (Mar. 22, 1999) <http-J/www.ala.org/alonline/
news/1999/990322.html> [hereinafter March 22, 1999 News Briefs]. In response, on
October 18, 1999, the City of Livermore and the ACLU filed amicus curiae briefs.
See News Briefs for October 25, 1999: City, ACLU File Appeal Briefs in Livermore
Filtering Case, AM. LIBR. ONLINE 3-4 (Oct. 25, 1999) <http:J/www.ala.org/
alonlinelnews/1999/991025.html>. The Livermore brief argues in support of the trial
coures finding that section 230 of the CDA preempts the state law on which the
plaintiff bases her argument in support of filtering. See id. The lawyer for the
plaintiff in Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, No. 15266-4 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed
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tions. However, public libraries now need to consider how they
might protect their staff from exposure to sexually explicit
Internet images since, although no claims have yet been filed,
there is evidence of such staff harassment by clients.12 Li-
brary staff, like workers in other customer service industries
who are subjected to behaviors of a sexual nature by clients
while at work, 3 should now be protected by a cause of action
against their library employers for third-party sexual harass-
ment when clients create a hostile work environment'4 by ex-
posing workers to sexually explicit Internet images.
Although library staff should be able to maintain a cause
of action for third-party sexual harassment to protect them-
selves from exposure to Internet pornography by clients, they
may face obstacles to establishing such a claim, and library
employers may raise several valid defenses. Some of these ob-
stacles are common to all hostile work environment claims,
such as the difficulty of showing that harassment based on
exposure to sexually explicit images is sufficiently severe in
and of itself to support a claim. 5 Some obstacles are common
July 23, 1997), Michael Millen, believes, however, that federal and state bills re-
quiring libraries to use filtering devices that are currently under consideration will
remedy his plaintiffs grievance before the appeal is decided. See March 22, 1999
News Briefs, supra. Additionally, a Virginia public library system has been success-
fully challenged by the ACLU and legally enjoined from enforcing its Internet use
policy that allowed for software filtering devices to screen out sexual content from
public Internet access. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 24 F. Supp.
2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998). The ACLU has publicly vowed to continue to challenge
any library systems which include filtering as part of their public Internet use
policies and plans to file a "barrage" of suits in 1999 toward that end. Jim
Nichols, ACLU to Sue Libraries Over Net Access, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 10,
1998, at lB.
"' See Reports of Pornography, supra note 3. For a complete discussion of the
staff harassment problem, see infra Part II.
13 Some of the other customer service environments in which claims have been
recognized for sexual harassment by clients include restaurants, retail stores,
health services, manufacturer sales, and casinos. See supra note 4.
14 Theoretically, it would be possible for a claimant to ground a third-party
claim on quid pro quo harassment where the harassment was accompanied by
some sort of job action by the employer, but no such claim has yet been reported.
See Mathews, supra note 4, at 990.
"' Showing the severity and pervasiveness of the harassing conduct is one of
the required elements of a hostile work environment claim. See Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283-84 (1998). Although a few courts have recog-
nized that a hostile work environment claim could be based on pornographic dis-
play alone, courts historically have not acknowledged this. See Discrimination-Free
Workplace, supra note 2, at 1076 (reporting that most courts have required other
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to third-party claims. For example, third-party claimants face
the difficulty of showing that an employer has not taken suffi-
cient remedial action against a harasser where the employer
maintains relatively little control over a non-employee's activi-
ties. 6 Also, a client service employer may attempt to assert
an assumption of risk defense where an employee has know-
ingly and voluntarily assumed a sexual component as some
part of a product or service offered to clients.'7 Finally, some
of these obstacles arise in the peculiar context of the public
library environment, such as the possibility that a public li-
brary employer may claim that its responsibilities to take re-
medial action in the face of harassment is constrained by over-
riding First Amendment responsibilities to clients' rights of
access to both Internet materials and to the public library
building itself."
types of harassing conduct in addition to image exposure to sustain claims).
16 See David S. Warner, Note, Third-Party Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: An Examination of Client Control, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 361, 385
(1995) (reporting that "appropriate remedial measures in ordinary hostile environ-
ment cases may not necessarily be feasible in third-party contexts" where employ-
ers have limited control over non-employees and risk "alienat[ing]" a client by
"foolhardy action").
17 Hooters restaurant, which uses a sexually charged atmosphere as its prin-
cipal customer draw, raised this defense when it was sued by a Minneapolis wait-
ress because of customer harassment, and "both sides in their initial salvos after
complaints were filed ... bandied about the assumption of risk defense." Jeannie
Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters Restaurant for Cus-
tomer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 192 (1998). Although
this Hooters case was settled without a court determination as to the viability of
the defense, "[d]icta in certain [sexual harassment] cases suggest that some courts
are also receptive to this position." Id. At least one commentator has advocated at
least limited viability of an assumption of risk defense in third-party claims since
the Hooters case. See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1137 (advocating that this defense
should be available where "sex appeal is a substantial part of the product or ser-
vice an employer provides to its customers").
" Four recent decisions have limited actions taken to protect constituents, in-
cluding library staff or clients, from exposure to Internet sexual content and its
residual effects; this suggests that courts value rights of access to such material
over the safety and security of staff or other clients. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.
Ct. 2329 (1997) (invalidating the CDA which would have exposed libraries to lia-
bility for exposures of minors to sexual content and which would have forced most
libraries to enforce sotme restrictions on access); Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of
Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) (invalidating a library filtering policy
which sought to prevent sexual harassment of both staff and other clients by cli-
ents); American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(invalidating state statute with similar goals to the CDA); Goldberg, supra note
11, at 17 (reporting California superior court dismissal of Kathleen R. v. City of
1999]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
It is the position of this Note that, despite such proof ob-
stacles and employer defenses, a third-party claim brought by
library staff under these conditions is viable. Part I of this
Note will define the claim of third-party sexual harassment as
it has been defined generally in Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission ("EEOC") Guidelines19 and in the case law.
Part II will discuss evidence of the growing concern with li-
brary staff harassment that arises from client use of Internet
pornography. Part Ill will discuss specific issues raised by fit-
ting a third-party library staff claim involving Internet pornog-
raphy display into the current third-party hostile environment
claim model, including possible employer defenses. Part IV
discusses measures library employers might take to reduce
their risk of liability. This Note concludes that library staff
who claim third-party sexual harassment by clients who expose
them to Internet sexual content will face many obstacles, as do
any other claimants of either co-worker or third-party harass-
ment. However, these workers should have the same right to a
safe, non-hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as do all other workers. None of the obsta-
cles or employer defenses discussed in this Note, including a
powerful preference for First Amendment protection of a
client's right to view sexual content at the library, presents a
legal death-knell to such a claim. Library clients, at least
adults, have an unassailable right to view Internet sexual
content in the public library." This does not mean they have
a right to couple their viewing with deliberate display of that
material to staff. Library staff should not be doubly discrimi-
nated against by both clients and the courts because of the
peculiarities of their working environment.
Livermore, No. 15266-4 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 17, 1997), which sought to
impose liability on a public library for its failure to use filtering software to keep
Internet pornography from the minor plaintiff).
19 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1980) (recognizing the potential for viable third-
party claims).
20 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
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I. THmD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT: HISTORY AND ANATOMY
OF THE CLAIM
Library staff claimants should encounter no problems
filing claims based on client harassment because such claims
have been recognized for nearly two decades. The EEOC has
formally recognized employer liability for sexual harassment
by non-employees as a violation of Title VII since 1980.21 In
the Guidelines issued to assist courts in adjudicating sexual
harassment cases,' the EEOC provided that: "An employer
may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,
where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees)
knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action."' Third-party
sexual harassment has been recognized by courts since at least
1981.' While subsequent complaints of third-party sexual
harassment may be voluminous,' thus far, there have been
few cases actually leading to litigation." However, there are
2, See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e).
' See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (D. Nev.
1992) ("The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted the[se] E.E.O.C. Guidelines for guid-
ance in examining hostile environment claims of sexual harassment.").
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e).
24 See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding employer liable for firing lobby attendant who refused to wear provocative
outfit that resulted in sexual comments from passersby and propositions). See also
Mark Hansen, The Next Litigation Frontier? Claims Against Employers for Third-
Party Harassment on the Rise, 79-SEP A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (1993) (describing Sage
Realty as "[olne of the first" third-party cases).
2 See Hansen, supra note 24, at 26 (citing a New York City lawyer who han-
dles discrimination cases exclusively who noted that complaints of third-party
harassment "cross her desk several times a weel').
", See supra note 4; see also Hansen, supra note 24, at 26 (reporting New York
discrimination lawyer Judith Vladecek's assertion that "complaints of third-party
harassment cross her desk several times a week" and lawyer Robert Fitzpatrick's
assertion that "mosV third-party claims are settled prior to litigation); Mathews,
supra note 4, at 989 ("Few cases have been brought on the basis of third-party
harassment. However, human resource experts predict that companies will see an
increase in [third-party] sexual harassment complaints due to publicity of third
party sexual harassment liability in the past few years.").
Additionally, in the wake of the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Lockard v. Pizza
Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998), there has been widespread publicity of
recognition of claims based on customer harassment not only in the legal press,
but even in the general business press. See, e.g., Jana Howard Carey, Sexual Ha-
rassment Update, 606 PLILIT 7, 78-80 (1999); Court Decisions, NATL L.J., Jan.
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indications that claims may be on the rise,27 and "courts have
duly noted that employers could face such liability for third-
party harassment, repeating the warning in case after case."28
Consequently, public library employers, like all employers
"who fail to protect their employees from being harassed by a
nonemployee" can expect to "do so at their own peril."29
11, 1999, at B19; Barbara Harris, Sexual Harassment at Work: "Just a Pat on the
Butt!", 48-OCT R.I. B.J. 5, 36, 36 n.62 (1999); D. Diane Hatch & James E. Hall,
Employer Liable for Customer Harassment of Employee, PERSONNEL J., Mar. 1,
1999, at 108; Alan R. Kabat & Debra S. Katz, Racial and Sexual Harassment
Employment Law, SE05 ALI-ABA 547, 601 (1999); Stephanie Levy, Sexual Harass-
ment by Customers Is Actionable Under Title VII, TRIAL MAG., Apr. 1, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 17784095; R. Bruce McAfee et al., Workplace Harassment: Em-
ployees vs. Customers, BUS. HORIZONS (MarJApr. 1999); Phil Milford, Franchisee,
Not Pizza Hut Inc. Held Liable for Sex Harassment, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec.
21, 1998, at 4; Carole O'Blenes, Harassment Grows More COMPLEX, MGMT. REV.,
June 1, 1999, at 49; Kristine W. Samuels & Sandra Leung, Harassment-Proofed Is
Liability Proofed, NATL L.J., Nov. 1, 1999, at B9; Diana P. Scott, Latest
Develpments in Sexual Discrimination and Harassment, SE17-ALI-ABA 77, 106
(1999); Beverly Bryan Swallows, Reducing Legal Risk and Avoiding Employment
Discrimination Claims, 19-SUM FRANCHISE L.J. 9, at *9-*10 (Summer 1999), avail-
able in Westlaw. Consequently, since Lockard, the right to third-party claims un-
der Title VII may have finally catapulted into the general conscience of lawyers,
workers and employers, which may result in more claims.
27 See Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment by Clients,
Customers, and Suppliers: How Employers Should Handle an Emerging Legal
Problem, 1994 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., June 1, 1994, at *1, available in 1994 WL
2809930 (describing third-party harassment as an emerging area of liability and
quoting a 1992 Wall Street Journal article that "feixperts say that such third-par-
ty harassment is rampant"); Francis Achampong, Employer Liability for Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Based on a Single Occurrence, 12 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 187, 188-91 (1995) [hereinafter Achampong, Single Occurrence) (describing how
potential employer liability for sexual harassment based on a single occurrence is
exacerbated, in part, by the "increasing number of third party harassment claims");
Hansen, supra note 24, at 26 ("[L]egal experts, employment lawyers and corporate
consultants say such third-party complaints are on the rise.").
' Rhee, supra note 17, at 173 (citing three circuit court cases and ten district
court cases which, between 1985 and 1992, recognized either potential or actual
employer liability for third-party harassment); see also Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,
162 F.3d 1062, 1073-1074 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing the holdings of other third-
party cases, Rodriguez, Crist, Folkerson, Menchaca, Powell, and Sage, and joining
its "sister circuits" in recognizing third-party claims because employers should be
liable for harassment "regardless of whether the environment was created by a co-
employee or a non-employee, since the employer ultimately controls the conditions
of the work environment").
29 Hansen, supra note 24, at 23.
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A. The Hostile Work Environment
While there are two recognized theories of sexual harass-
ment," quid pro quo"' and hostile work environment,32
third-party claims will most likely be filed under the hostile
environment theory. However, the potential for a quid pro quo
claim still exists,3 especially since the Supreme Court recent-
" The EEOC Guidelines on "Discrimination Because of Sex" outline the two
theories of employer liability for sexual harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
ployment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(3) (1980); see also Achampong, Single Occurrence, supra
note 27, at 189; ("The [EEOC] Guidelines recognize two forms of sexual harass-
ment: 'quid pro quo' . . . and 'hostile environment' . . ").
31 Quid pro quo harassment occurs where an employee's work benefits, pay,
promotions, bonuses, etc., are denied or granted based on an employee submitting
to a superior's request for sexual favors. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986) (affirming both quid pro quo and hostile work environment harass-
ment as violations of Title VII based on sex discrimination); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(1)-(2); Achampong, Single Occurrence, supra note 27, at 188-91; Ann
C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The 'Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1565-66 (1994) ("Quid pro quo ha-
rassment involves a grant or denial of economic benefits following the employee's
response to 'unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.' A clear example . . .amounts to
'sleep with me or I'll fire you.'").
32 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
" Since third-party claims do not ordinarily involve conduct by supervisory em-
ployees or coworkers, they rest most logically on analysis under a hostile work
environment theory. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 990 ("Typically, the environ-
ment.., becomes hostile or offensive due to a customer .... Although there
have been no quid pro quo third-party sexual harassment cases reported, this
potential exists."); Francis Achampong, Third Party Harassment and Other Signifi-
cant Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Law: A Discussion of the Latest
Developments in Workplace Sexual Harassment Litigation, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
631, 652 (1994) [hereinafter Achampong, Recent Developments] (reasoning that
"[t]here is no plausible reason why" courts should not assess employer liability
based on conduct by third-parties under the quid pro quo theory in cases where
an employee is fired as a result of refusal to tolerate such conduct because "[s]uch
behavior inflicts a tangible job detriment on the employee"). But see Juliano, supra
note 31, at 1566 ("The quid pro quo claim arises only when the plaintiff shows a
link between the job detriment and a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual
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ly blurred the distinction between the two theories.' In
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth," the Court indicated
that the only substantive difference between quid pro quo and
hostile work environment is that quid pro quo cases establish
an "explicit" alteration in terms of conditions of employment,
while hostile environment claims involve only "constructive"
alterations of employment conditions in which the "threats to
retaliate" against a victim merely remain "unfulfilled."36
The Court, however, maintained the force of the distinc-
tion in terms of the showing necessary to establish a claim
under each theory. Notably, the constructive alteration pres-
ent in a hostile environment claim requires a further show-
ing than that required in a quid pro quo claim. Conduct com-
prising hostile environment harassment must be "severe or
pervasive.""7
The Court also established a new affirmative defense
available only in the context of hostile work environment
claims. The defense is based on whether an employer makes a
reasonable effort to protect employees from harassment and
whether a victim reasonably participates in her own protec-
tion.38 Because quid pro quo and hostile work environment
advances .... A hostile working environment claim arises in situations in which
an employee must endure verbal or physical abuse as part of her employment but
does not suffer a tangible job detriment.").
Additionally, since third-party claims are non-supervisory and thus more anal-
ogous to co-worker claims, courts will evaluate them under the same negligence
standard as co-worker claims. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074
(10th Cir. 1998).
" See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998).
Id. at 2257.
" Id. at 2264.
7 Id.
' See id. at 2270 ("[We adopt the following holding in this case and in
Faragher v. Boca Raton . . . ."); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.
Ct. 2275, 2292 (1998). The Court established that an employer is now entitled to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence: "(a) that the employer exercised reason-
able care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preven-
tive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise." Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. The Court further held that the promulga-
tion of an anti-harassment policy by the employer and complaint procedure would
not be necessary in every case to fulfill the defense, but its existence or nonexis-
tence could be considered as a relevant factor in the determination of the first
element. See id. Likewise, the Court explained that failure by an employee to use
an employer complaint procedure would not be dispositive in every case, "demon-
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claims maintain separate showings and defenses, and because
any library third-party claims would most likely be filed under
the hostile environment theory, only the viability of a hostile
work environment claim filed by library staff will be analyzed
in this Note.
In addition to the required showing that harassing conduct
was so pervasive or severe to constructively alter the condi-
tions of employment, Title VII hostile work environment claims
generally require a showing by the employee plaintiff that she
was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; that the
conduct was directed at the employee based on her sex; that
such conduct was unwelcome and that the employer knows or
should have known about the conduct and failed to take imme-
diate remedial action.39 Additionally, although intentional
conduct is not ordinarily identified as a formal element of the
claim, courts may require such a showing because, as the Su-
preme Court has stated, "[slexual harassment under Title VII
presupposes intentional conduct."'
Courts have developed tests for some of these elements. To
determine severity or pervasiveness, courts look at the totality
of circumstances in each case.4 There is, therefore, no "math-
ematical" formula as to what type of conduct is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to satisfy the claim.42 Factors examined
stration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's bur-
den . . ." Id. The Court restricted the availability of the defense to only those
cases where the employee had suffered no "tangible employment action, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment" as a culmination to the harass-
ment, thus restricting its application effectively to just hostile work environment
claims. IM
" See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2281-84; Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107
(7th Cir. 1993); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)-(g) (1980).
'" Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2266.
41 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
42 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); see also Baskerville v.
Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Drawing the line is not al-
ways easy. On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amo-
rous or hostile ... uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; ob-
scene language or gestures; pornographic pictures .... On the other side lies the
occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo ... .
Courts often rely on and quote this passage from Baskerville to represent the
difficult, non-bright line nature of determining severity. See, e.g., Fall v. Indiana
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877 (N.D. Ind. 1998); General Accident
Ins. Co. v. Gastineau, 990 F. Supp. 631, 634 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Johnson v. Wal-
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may include, but are not limited to, the "frequency of the dis-
criminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." ' 3 Courts apply an objective-subjective standard
to the severity test, requiring that the conduct be perceived as
severe by both the reasonable observer and the plaintiff her-
self.' However, courts and commentators disagree as to
whether the objective component should be applied under a
reasonable woman or reasonable person standard in cases
where the plaintiff is female.45 The failure to use a reasonable
Mart Stores, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
' Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283. A "merely unpleasant work environment,' even
one that includes occasional vulgarity and seemingly abusive behavior is generally
not enough to support a hostile work environment claim. Mart v. Dr Pepper Co.,
923 F. Supp. 1380, 1388 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding an employee's crude language
"highly inappropriate" but insufficient alone to support claim of hostile work envi-
ronment); see also Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding touching
of the plaintiff and sexist comments insignificant and thus insufficient to support
claim); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding isolat-
ed propositions, slaps on buttocks, and sexual comments insufficient to support
claim of hostile work environment). But see Achampong, Single Occurrence, supra
note 27, at 193 n.43 (noting that one year after the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Jordan, the Ninth Circuit found sufficiently severe and pervasive conduct to sup-
port a hostile work environment claim on facts similar to those in Jordan, includ-
ing "sexual remarks, vulgarity, and requests for sexual favors"). The Supreme
Court has stressed that Title VII should not become a "civility code" and that con-
duct such as "sporadic" use of abusive language or gender related jokes, or occa-
sional teasing would prove insufficiently severe to support a claim. Faragher, 118
S. Ct. at 2284 (citing BARBARA LINDEMAN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992)).
" See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2284; see also Rhee, supra note 17, at 173 n.50
(reporting that in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), the
Supreme Court adopted an "objective-subjective standard" to determine whether
harassment is "severe and pervasive" including a need to show not only likelihood
that harassment would disrupt a worker's ability to work, but that it actually
had).
41 The First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all
employed the reasonable person standard. See Snaden, supra note 5, at 1234 n.55.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have both recognized the reasonable woman stan-
dard. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that reasonable
woman could have found a letter of a sexual nature sent by co-worker to plaintiff
sufficiently severe); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating
that "person standing in the shoes of employee should be the 'reasonable woman'");
see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Femi-
nist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 563
n.188 (1992); Rhee, supra note 17, at 173 n.50 ("[Qluestions still remain as to
whether this [objective] standard is from the perspective of a reasonable male or
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woman standard has been criticized because it is widely be-
lieved that use of the reasonable person standard deprives
female plaintiffs of what would otherwise be viable claims.46
Whichever standard is chosen, the objectivity of this test theo-
retically insulates employers from legal responsibility toward
"'hypersensitive'" employees known as "'egg-shell' plaintiffs."47
Concerning the other tests, whether conduct is of a sexual
nature or is unwelcome are both questions for the jury.4"
from the perspective of a reasonable female .... Critics condemned [a Sixth
Circuit decision finding against a female plaintiff] ... as adopting the perspective
of a 'reasonable man' when the victim was a woman . . . " where the plaintiff
had claimed that a male supervisor's vulgar name calling and sexually explicit
posters created a hostile environment but the court felt that such incidents were
not offensive enough in the context of society at large).
The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether a "reasonable wom-
an" standard should be adopted. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 17
(1993). In Harris, the trial court had evaluated harassment under a reasonable
woman standard yet found the incident not severe enough to create hostile envi-
ronment because of a failure by the female plaintiff to demonstrate any psychologi-
cal harm. See id. at 21-22. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue of whether a plaintiff must show psychological harm to succeed in a hostile
environment claim. See id. While the Court ruled a plaintiff no longer need show
psychological harm, Justice O'Connor advocated application of the more stringent
reasonable person, not the reasonable woman, to such cases in the dicta of her
opinion. See id. Some commentators have interpreted her statement in the dicta as
inconclusive. See Snaden, supra note 5, at 1234 ("There is a conflict among the
circuits on the issue of which standard should be used to evaluate hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims (reasonable person or reasonable woman). [The]
issue [since Harris] has not yet been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court.");
Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 27, at *4 ("It should be noted that, despite the
perception of some commentators stemming from Justice O'Conner's [sic] rather
brief opinion in . . . [Harris], the 'average reasonable woman' standard, enunciated
in Ellison, is still very much intact. It has not been replaced by the more forgiv-
ing 'average reasonable person' standard . . . . Justice O'Connor does use the
latter term. Yet it must be noted that the Court did not grand certiorari to ad-
dress this matter."). However, in Faragher, the most recent Supreme Court deci-
sion on sexual harassment, which also happened to be filed by a female plaintiff,
Justice Souter used the "reasonable person" language when reiterating the severity
test. See Faragher, 117 S. Ct. at 2283. In Burlington, Faragher's companion opin-
ion, Justice Kennedy avoided stating the reasonableness standard although he
reiterated the required severity element at least three times therein. See
Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2263-65.
'6 See ERNEST C. HADLEY & GEORGE M. CHUZI, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: FEDERAL
LAW *3 (1997), available in Westlaw ("[B]ehavior a reasonable woman would find
objectionable may be actionable 'even if many people may deem it to be harmless
or insignificant.'").
4? Hallberg v. Eat'n Park, No. 94-1888, 1996 WL 182212, at *9-*10 (W.D. Pa.
1996) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir.
1990)).
" See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027-28 (D. Nev.
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Whether the employer knows or should have known of the
harassing conduct is satisfied when it is established that the
employer had either actual knowledge of harassment through
employee complaints or constructive knowledge of offensive
conduct due to its pervasiveness.49
Last, whether the employer has taken sufficient steps to
remedy the situation is the subject of much current litiga-
tion 0 and is generally dependent upon the nature of the ha-
rassment itself.5' Employers have been required by courts to
show that not only some action was taken, but also the effec-
tiveness of that action-or at least its reasonable calculation to
remedy the harassment.52 While the Supreme Court did incor-
1992); Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 27, at 33. Courts differ "as to whether an
objective or subjective standard applies" in determining unwelcomeness and as to
what type of evidence should be admitted for an objective test. Rhee, supra note
17, at 170 n.30.
Neither the sexual or unwelcomeness elements required to establish the third-
party hostile work environment claim in the context of library Internet content
give rise to issues of a significantly different nature than as they appear in any
other type of hostile work environment claim. Thus, they are not discussed in
depth in this Note. For a brief discussion of the application of the sexual element
to the third-party library claim, see infra Part IH.B.
"' See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1531
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (determining that the sexually harassing behavior was "too perva-
sive to have escaped the notice of a reasonably alert management"); see also Rhee,
supra note 17, at 173 n.51 (citing Robinson and advising that "[glenerally, if ha-
rassment is pervasive, courts find that the employer has the requisite knowledge").
"o See Rhee, supra note 17, at 173 n.52 ("Litigants have begun to contest vigor-
ously the standards for 'immediate and appropriate corrective action' to allegations
of sexual harassment.").
51 The sufficiency of remedial action is open to debate and "depend[ent] upon
the gravity of the alleged harassment." Mart v. Dr Pepper Co., 923 F. Supp. 1380,
1388 (D. Kan. 1996); see also Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 4, at *36.
52 Conduct, even if prompt, must be reasonably calculated to actually remedy
the harassment. See Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 4, at *36 ("Prompt action
that is not reasonably likely to prevent the misconduct is ineffective. In this re-
spect, ineffective action is equal to no action.") (describing Intlekofer v. Turnage,
973 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992), in which the court of appeals held that an employer
failed to meet his obligation to act when, after notice of sixteen complaints of
harassment by an employee, the employer issued a warning that additional com-
plaints would result in "a more severe disciplinary measure," but that this warn-
ing was followed by further harassing incidents).
The remedial action need not be instantaneous, however, and may include an
appropriate time lag that allows the employer to respond to complaints properly.
See id. at *36-*37 (citing Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix, 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.
1987), in which an employer's action was judged sufficiently prompt where it
promised the employee that she would not have to work with a contractor who
had "touched her breasts and playfully choked her' after a completion of a compa-
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porate the showing of remedial action by an employer into an
affirmative defense, the Court did so only in the context of
supervisory harassment in both Burlington and Faragher.53
Consequently, it remains to be seen whether this defense will
be applied in the third-party context.
B. Special Characteristics of the Third-Party Hostile Work En-
vironment Claim
In at least sixteen cases since 1981, federal courts have
recognized liability of employers for creation of a sexually hos-
tile work environment by third parties.'4 It is likely that
many more of these cases have been settled.55 The elements
needed to establish a third-party claim are the same as those
for establishing other hostile environment claims.5" However,
courts may evaluate the sufficiency of a plaintiff's showing of
at least two of the claim elements quite differently in the
third-party context than they do for cases of traditional co-
worker or supervisor harassment. 57 These two elements in-
clude whether an employer has actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the harassment and whether an employer has taken
appropriate, effective remedial action.5" The EEOC Guidelines
advocate that when a court is assessing employer liability for
ny presentation, one and one-half days after his notification). But see Llewellyn v.
Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (employer's two-week delay in
investigating third-party harassment claim not sufficiently prompt); Achampong,
Recent Developments, supra note 33, at 648 (citing Llewellyn v. Celanese and stat-
ing: "It would appear advisable ... for an employer to waste no time in taking
remedial action, once acquiring notice of the harassment.").
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (lifeguard ha-
rassed by "immediate supervisors"); Burlington Indus., Inc. v Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.
2262 (1998) (salesperson subjected to harassment by mid-level management super-
visor).
" See supra note 4.
, See Rhee, supra note 17, at 164 (reporting that although highly publicized
third-party claims were filed by waitresses against the Hooters restaurant chain
for customer harassment in at least six cities during 1993-94, all those suits set-
tled in 1994); Achampong, Recent Developments, supra note 33, at 645-46 (report-
ing settled case where lobbyist employee was removed from'a client account by
employer after she refused a date with the client).
" See Achampong, Recent Developments, supra note 33, at 642-43.
5' See Achampong, Recent Developments, supra note 33, at 642-43.
" See Mathews, supra note 4, at 991 ("The issues of employer knowledge and
control surround the reported cases of third party sexual harassment in the
workplace."); Achampong, Recent Developments, supra note 33, at 642-43.
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third-party conduct, it should consider the "extent of the
employer's control ... with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees."59 This control factor has been included in courts'
assessments of employer knowledge" and remedial action.6
The requirements for employer's knowledge are paid spe-
cial attention by courts in third-party claims because, while
actual knowledge is generally satisfied by proving that an
employee complained to management, showing that the em-
ployer had constructive knowledge of a pervasive problem can
be more difficult in a third-party customer service environ-
ment.62 This is true because employers may not yet be aware
of any legal responsibility for harassment of employees by non-
employees.63 More significantly, in customer service organiza-
59 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1980); see also Maureen E. McClain et al., Recent
Developments in Sex Discrimination, 308 PLI/LIT 191, 209 (1986) (noting that a
special factor in third-party cases is that the EEOC Guidelines advocate that
courts "take into consideration the degree of control the employer has over the
conduct of the non-employee").
60 See Warner, supra note 16, at 374-78 (suggesting that Magnuson v. Peak
Technical Services, 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992), establishes a "variable
knowledge standard" whereby a court may require that when an employer is on
the same site as where the harassment took place, constructive knowledge may
suffice, but when an employer is on a different site than the harassment, an em-
ployer must have actual notice of harassment by third-parties to establish suffi-
cient knowledge).
61 See Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2439, 1994 WL 566943, at *6-*7 (D. Kan. 1994)
(holding that employer's relative lack of control of non-employee indicates that a
single letter to the non-employee's outside supervisors notifying them of non-
employee's inappropriate conduct constitutes a sufficient remedial attempt, but if
the harasser were an employee, more remedial action might be required of the
employer).
62 See Warner, supra note 16, at 373-74 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982)).
' See Achampong, Recent Developments, supra note 33, at 642. However, be-
cause of widespread publicity of employer liability for customer harassment in the
wake of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 163 F.3d 1062
(10th Cir. 1998), and some earlier third-party decisions from the 1990s, see supra
note 26, courts may be less and less sympathetic to the difficulties employers may
claim in gaining knowledge of customer harassment in the future and will likely
expect the same level of responsiveness to this type of harassment as all others.
In Lockard, the Tenth Circuit held a franchisor liable where a waitress had asked
not to serve two customers prior to the harassing incident, although the waitress
had not apprised the manager of the reason she did not want to serve these cus-
tomers nor that they had made sexually aggressive comments to her in the past.
See id. at 1062. Such specific warnings might have more effectively signaled the
manager that a possible sexual harassment problem existed, as opposed to any
other type of customer service problem, but the court of appeals found it unneces-
sary. See id.
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tions, it is often true that the site of the hostile environment
created by a non-employee is not located within the primary
employer's own workplace, thus complicating the communica-
tion of harassment.' However, even in third-party cases, an
employer cannot shield itself from knowledge with deliberate
ignorance of the law, of the harassing conduct, or of actual
notice due to employee complaints.65 Moreover, actual notice
to the employer is no more difficult for a plaintiff to establish
in a third-party claim than in a co-worker or supervisor claim.
Similarly, a court's assessment of whether an employer has
taken immediate and appropriate remedial action that is rea-
sonably calculated to end harassment can be problematic in
third-party claims primarily because of the relative lack of the
employer's control,66 and because of judicial sensitivity to the
strong effect that fear of economic reprisal from clients may
have on an employer's response to harassment.67 However,
even EEOC-sanctioned sensitivity to these special concerns in
See Mathews, supra note 4, at 991-92 (detailing a myriad of client employ-
ment environments where the employee can be subject to harassment outside of
the employer's own work environment); Warner, supra note 16, at 374-78 (assert-
ing that primary employer's work environment can be isolated from the actual site
of harassment by customers especially in situations where an employee is dis-
patched to a client's office, thus making it difficult for employers to assess the
hostile environment).
" See Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 4, at *35 ('Te employer [faced with a
third-party claim] cannot avoid liability by burying its head in the sand-the so
called 'ostrich defense' or deliberate ignorance.").
" See Wyse, 1994 WL 566943, at *6.
The EEOC ultimately imposed liability on one restaurant owner after finding
his failure to take remedial action sufficiently lacking only because his ability to
confront a non-employee harasser was within his control where that particular
customer was a "regular" and a good friend of the owner. See Warner, supra note
16, at 383, 385, 387 (citing EEOC Dec. 84-3, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1887, 1891 (1984), and noting that "all businesses naturally have strong concerns
toward maintaining favorable and amicable relationships with their customers and
clients in order to preserve their own fiscal health .... Unfortunately even a
mere inquiry about the propriety of the client's behavior . . . could very likely
jeopardize the stability of these relationships."); see also Kaplowitz & Harris, supra
note 4, at *34 ("Employers may be put in the position of either condoning sexual
harassment of their employees or losing valuable business."); Mathews, supra note
4, at 177 (advocating that when harassment occurs, employers should remedy the
situation by either removing the employee from serving that client, terminating
the business relationship, or talking to the client, but that most employers take




third-party cases does not mean courts are reluctant to impose
liability for sexual harassment."
II. CREATION OF THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT BY THIRD-
PARTIES IN THE PUBLIC LIBRARY-EVIDENCE OF A GROWING
PROBLEM
As client service environments, public libraries are vulner-
able to the same third-party harassment as are other customer
service businesses.69 The professional library literature has
recognized that public libraries are now far from being the safe
havens from society that they once were considered.7" Public
libraries are increasingly subjected to the same ills of human
behavior as are other public places, including crime7' and oth-
" See Hernandez v. Miranda Velez, No. 92-2701, 1994 WL 394855, at *8
(D.P.R. July 20, 1994) (denying summary judgment where employer had taken no
action in the face of complaint of customer harassment except to remind complain-
ant that the alleged harasser "was an important client"); see also supra note 4.
" See Mathews, supra note 4, at 996 ("Any employer with clients that visit its
office is susceptible, to Title VII liability for sexual harassment those clients im-
pose upon the employer's employees.").
'0 See Bruce A. Shuman, Designing Personal Safety into Library Buildings, AM.
LIBR., Aug. 1996, at 37 (reporting that the murder of a rural librarian shatters
the "naive notion" that small towns and libraries are "safe havens").
1 See, e.g., Tom R. Arterburg, Librarians: Caretakers or Crimefighters?, AM.
LIBR., Aug. 1996, at 33 (reporting that public libraries are now often clients of the
type of violence management training provided in the past to more "traditionally
violence prone establishments such as health-care facilities and corrections centers"
by the National Crisis Prevention Institute, ("NCPI"), where five years previously
NCPI experienced no library inquiries for its services); Patricia Bangs, When Bad
Things Happen in Good Libraries, PUB. LEBR., May/June 1998, at 196 (reporting
that by 1995 "[s]taff in Fairfax's branches had noticed an increase in crime and
lesser disturbances that reflected a trend reported by library officials nationwide");
Ann Curry, Managing the Problem Patron, PUB. LIBRP, May/June 1996, at 18-83
(reporting that library employees experience an "ever-increasing" incidence of "chal-
lenging personal encounters" with "problem patrons" due largely to societal chang-
es, including reduced government funding for care facilities, which thrust an in-
creasing number of "troubled individuals," "unsupervised," into aspects of main-
stream "urban life" such as going to the public library, and advocating that in re-
sponse, library workers should assert their rights "to work in a safe environment"
and "not to be unduly or continually harassed"); Nancy Milnor Smith, Staff Ha-
rassment by Patrons: Why Administrators Flinch, AM. LMR., Apr. 1994, at 316
(detailing Smith's own experience of increased general harassment as a library
employee whereas when she began work as a public reference librarian in 1976,
she experienced an "occasional 'odd person' hanging around," or "'peeper,'" yet "did
not feel threatened" while manning the reference desk, but that the situation had
changed because of the increase of "problem patron[s]" who presented a "mere
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er harassing and abusive behaviors perpetrated by clients,72
especially those directed toward staff.7" One of these ills is
sexual harassment.74
Although as yet there have been no filed cases of sexual
harassment of library employees by clients, there is recognition
within the library professional literature that sexual harass-
ment can occur not only between library employees and each
annoyance" in the mid-70s but had escalated in both increased numbers and vol-
ume of menace to today's "real threat"); Evan St. Lifer, How Safe Are Our Librar-
ies?, LiBR. J., Aug. 1994, at 35-36 (reporting that increasing library crime now
includes not only theft and mutilation of library materials, but also violent crime,
including, arson, assault, sexual assault, murder, and hostage incidents involving
the use of bombs, and that such crime "continues to fester" due to the apathy of
law enforcement, lack of adequate security measures, and library dilemmas over
how to implement security measures without restraining access to materials).
72 See, e.g., St. Lifer, supra note 71, at 36 ("[Vjiolent or abusive behavior re-
mains a library security risk to be reckoned with-particularly among public librar-
ies . . ").
" See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 70, at 37 (reporting that both library patrons
and staff are "increasingly at risk" from violent acts by clients at public libraries
and detailing several such incidents, including, a 1992 murder of a rural Arizona
librarian, a 1993 murder of a Georgia librarian, and a shooting spree directed
toward several library staff at a Sacramento, California public library in 1993); St.
Lifer, supra note 71, at 35-36 (reporting the risk of "violent or abusive behavior
directed toward staff" by unstable clients, incidents of assault on a library staff
member, and sexual assault of a librarian by library clients).
71 Public libraries have begun to experience a number of the type of client
behaviors typically identified as sexually harassing conduct, including "body touch-
ing, obscene or nude photographs, or other sexual words or conduct that has the
'purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perfor-
mance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.'" Alan
M. Koral, Critical Decisions in the Investigation of a Sex Harassment Claim: Prac-
tice Pointers and Case Law Update, 587 PLIILIT 129, 136 (1998) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (1980)). For examples of occurrences of such behaviors, see, for exam-
ple, Bangs, supra note 71, at 196 (citing a study by a criminologist which indicat-
ed that by the early 1980s, of over 1700 public libraries studied during a 12-
month period, 15% to 20% had experienced incidents of "indecent exposure" and
that since then, Fairfax County library staff had "sensed that both the frequency
and types" of all such "problem behavior" had increased); and Curry, supra note
71, at 181, 183, 186-87, 188 n.2 ("Public libraries must deal with incidents caused
by problem patrons with increasing frequency. Most staff are badly shaken by ...
sexual innuendo ... ."). Curry also details the rise in all kinds of 'problem pa-
tron" behaviors which harass public library staff, including "flashers," and presents
a 'case study" exercise directed to library managers. Curry, supra note 71, at 183.
The case study includes a scenario in which a library staff member is repeatedly
followed by a patron who sometimes "touches the crotch of his jeans," a scenario
described as having "sexual overtones" and reports that the Vancouver Public




other, but also as a result of library clients harassing staff.75
The professional literature also recognizes that not only are all
harassing behaviors of a sexual nature increasing in librar-
ies, 6 but specifically third-party behaviors of a sexual nature
tantamount to sexual harassment directed at staff by clients
are increasing.77 Despite this recognized increase, library
management remains largely unresponsive to the growing
third-party sexual harassment problem.7"
"' One academic library developed a policy designed to combat all harassment,
especially that of a sexual nature. See Mary Lou Goodyear & William K. Black,
Combatting Sexual Harassment: A Public Service Perspective, AM. LIBR., Feb. 1991,
at 134. In so doing, the library followed guidelines on sexual harassment devel-
oped by the American Library Association ("ALA"), an association dedicated to
public libraries. See id. This policy on harassment stated: "Harassment can occur
between library employees, between library patrons, or between library staff and
library patrons." Id.
See supra note 74.
7 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 71, at 316 (advocating that library administra-
tors will not be able to hide from increased sexual harassment of staff by patrons
by "refusing to acknowledge the problem"). In a 1992 study of "Librarians and
Sex" that was initially intended only to be humorous, one librarian author said he
"went looking for laughs and ended up with tears" when he shockingly discovered
that out of 2,797 librarian respondents, 78% of female librarians, or 1,816, and 7%
of male librarians, had been "sexually harassed by a library patron" in the previ-
ous 12-month period. Will Manley, The Manley Report, AM. LIBR., Mar. 1993, at
258; Will Manley, No Laughing Matter This Month, AM. LIBR, Jan. 1993, at 68
[hereinafter Manley, No Laughing Matter]. Manley further reported that "almost
35% of that [harassed] group felt so strongly about their experience that they
made unsolicited comments on the subject," including descriptions of harassing
incidents and comments such as, 'Some days the harassment is so bad that I
want to quit my job." Manley, No Laughing Matter, supra, at 68.
Unsettled by these results, Manley subsequently conducted a more in-depth
survey in 1993 as the basis for a four-part series of articles on sexual harassment
of library staff by patrons. See Will Manley, Sexual Harassment By Patrons: Part
Two, AM. LIBR., July/Aug. 1993 [hereinafter Manley, Part Two]; Will Manley, Sexu-
al Harassment by Patrons: Part Three, AM. LIBR., Sept. 1993 [hereinafter Manley,
Part Three]; Will Manley, Sexual Harassment by Patrons: Part Four, AM. LIBR.,
Oct. 1993 [hereinafter Manley, Part Four]. This series was published in AMERICAN
LIBRARIES, a professional periodical which focuses on public library issues. See id&
Manley discovered that out of 3,758 librarian respondents reporting on frequency
of sexual harassment by patrons during a 12-month period, 7% had been sexually
harassed "daily,'" 22% "weekly,'" 40% "monthly,'" and 4% "less than monthly.'"
Manley, Part Two, supra, at 652; see also Manley, No Laughing Matter, supra, at
68; Manley, Part Three, supra, at 756; Manley, Part Four, supra, at 828.
"' Authors of articles recognizing sexual harassment of library staff by patrons
also detail how those staff "cannot rely on their administrators to protect them
from harassment," and how library staff reporting the existence of this lroblem
also report that "supervisors gave strong signals that they do not even want such
harassment reported to them." Smith, supra note 71, at 316; see also Goodyear &
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Specifically, there are indications that behaviors involving
staff exposure to sexually graphic Internet images 9 are re-
sulting from client use of Internet sexual content and are being
considered harassment of staff.8" Such indications of a harass-
ment problem due to exposure to Internet sexual content ap-
pear not only anecdotally in the library professional litera-
ture,81 but also in discussions by professional organizations
and libraries themselves regarding potential liability due to
allowing access to the Internet,82 and in library Internet use
policies written by libraries themselves.' It has already been
Black, supra note 75, at 134 ("While many library managers have taken action
against sexual harassment between supervisors and subordinates, they have been
strangely silent concerning such harassment between library employees and pa-
trons, or between one patron and another.").
" The professional literature recognizes harassing behaviors involving public
library staff exposure by clients to images of a sexual nature by patrons predates
the availability of Internet images and does not always involve so-called pornogra-
phy. See Goodyear & Black, supra note 75, at 134 (detailing incident where "a
library employee is working at the main circulation desk," leaves the desk momen-
tarily, and returns to find that a patron had left "a biology textbook ... open on
her desk to the chapter on female human reproductive systems," and "[w]ritten
across the top of the page are the words "'Sure like to see yours."). However, the
literature also recognizes that the Internet provides a newly evocative forum for
"'pornographic,' or 'sexually explicit,' or 'sexually suggestive' sites." Hyman, supra
note 8, at 60-62; see also Dorothy Field, One Library's Approach, AM. LIR., Nov.
1997, at 63 (reporting that since the introduction of the Internet, public libraries
have faced increased challenges to their traditional "dissemination" policies because
of the attractiveness of the Internet to "marketers of hard-core pornography" and
that "pornography has always been with us, from the earliest days of civilization,
but never has there been a more effective tool for marketing this material and
attracting new consumers than the Internet').
"0 See, e.g., David Burt, Policies for the Use of Public Internet Workstations in
Public Libraries, PUB. LIR., May/June 1997, at 157 (reporting that many public
library policies forbid client use of Internet pornography to harass staff or other
clients); Karen A.K. Keller, Printing & Porn (visited Jan. 15, 1999)
<http'/www.mlc.lib.mi.us/hyperm/archives/michlib-1/1998/1482.html> [hereinafter
Keller, Printing & Porn] ("Circulation Staff are now bothered by the fact that
some (a very few) patrons will print pornography and then the Staff member has
to handle this material .... Could this be consider [sic] sexual harassment (one
patron-male-visits and prints out bondage sites... our Circulation Staff is all
female)?"); Reports of Pornography, supra note 3 (website detailing public library
reports of library client behaviors relating to client use of Internet sexual content
to which staff or other clients have objected, including staff exposure to sexual
images).
, See, e.g., Burt, supra note 80, at 157.
82 See infra notes 103, 105-107 and accompanying text.
'3 See, e.g., Bell County Public Library System, Internet Access Policy (visited
Jan. 18, 1999) <http'/www.tcnet/pinevillelib/net.html> ("[Dlisplaying sexually explic-
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recognized that staff exposure to sexually graphic images
online, if perpetrated by a library co-worker, could constitute
sexual harassment for which a claim for civil damages could
be made.'
Further, there are indications within the literature that
there is a general trend in underreporting all incidents of sexu-
al harassment of library staffY Thus, underreported incidents
could include those arising out of client use of Internet pornog-
raphy. Failure by library staff to report such incidents would
mirror a general trend in all workplaces where it is estimated
that 95% of harassing incidents go unreported.8 6
it material in public constitutes sexual harassment ... ."); Loudoun County Public
Library Board of Trustees, Loudoun Country Public Library Internet Use Policy
(visited Nov. 25, 1998) <httpt/www.lcpl.lib.va.us/wwwpol.htm> [hereinafter Loudoun
County, Internet Use Policy]; Saint Paul Public Library, Saint Paul Public Library
Policy on the Internet (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.stpaul.lib.mn.us/pag-
es/policy.htm> ("[Miaterials on the Internet are not screened in any way, sexually
explicit graphics have been displayed causing detrimental consequences includ-
ing . . . sexual harassment of staff. . . ."); see also Burt, supra note 80, at 156-57
(analyzing 75 public library Internet access policies to answer the question, among
others, of how libraries are managing Internet "pornography" and finding that 20%
of the policies bar clients from using "Internet workstations" to "harass others"
and 12% bar "viewing pornography on Internet workstations").
" See A.J. Anderson, How Do You Manage? Analysis I: Try a Little Respect,
LIBR. J., Feb. 1, 1997, at 55 (presenting a case-study exercise directed to public
library managers in which a female staff member is exposed to "a [computer]
screen saver consisting of naked women floating all over the place" by another
staff member who leaves it on his computer screen where the female had to fre-
quent his office for work-related discussions, and how, if the female employee was
offended by this behavior, "a sexual harassment charge could be levied."). Another
analyst writing on the same scenario posed a solution which included that the
employee displaying the offensive sexual screen saver should be "reminded of the
legal definition of sexual harassment." Kenneth G. Hodosy, How Do You Manage?
Analysis II: Porno Isn't the Problem, LIBR. J., Feb. 1, 1997, at 56.
An article advising on new library liability issues surrounding Internet use
advocated that managers take note of employee use of sexually explicit Internet
images at work as a potential source of sexual harassment claims: "If an employee
accesses and downloads pornography or other obscene material into a library's
computer, such material may be relevant in a sexual harassment suit at a later
time." Uhler & Weiss, supra note 9, at 118.
"' See Goodyear & Black, supra note 75, at 134-36 (advocating ending the "si-
lence" of both library staff and administrators on sexual harassment of staff by
clients).
86 See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexu-
al Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 523 (1994) (citing UNITED STATES MER-
IT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
ENT: AN UPDATE 27 (1988)). One survey of psychological and sociological studies
showed that such studies "generally agree" that "targets are reluctant to lodge
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Underreporting of sexual harassment in the library environ-
ment is due to a variety of factors. Factors can include fear of
administrative apathy and reprisal,87 fear that claims will not
be taken seriously,"m victim guilt or shame, 9 general lack of
empowerment in library staff assertion of workplace rights,"m
and difficulty in identifying the boundaries of sexually harass-
ing behaviors." Perhaps the most significant factor identified
as contributing to underreporting of harassment is library staff
"hav[ingl a difficult time taking some action that they may see
as conflicting with their service philosophy toward the [cli-
ent]." 2 This factor may prove very significant to possible
underreporting of harassment involving client Internet use. It
is already recognized that library staff are having a difficult
time acknowledging all manner of problems resulting from
providing Internet access in libraries because of their fear of
appearing less than dedicated to the "professional party-line"
First Amendment goal of providing entirely unrestricted client
access." Consequently, there is reason to believe that this re-
formal complaints against their harassers," and one study indicated that only "five
percent" of targets file formal complaints. Id- (citations omitted). Reasons for why
targets fail to file complaints include "fear of reprisal and blame, concerns about a
loss of privacy, or the belief that nothing would done in response to the com-
plaint." Id. (citations omitted).
', See Smith, supra note 71, at 316 (Library "supervisors gave strong signals
that they do not even want such harassment reported to them.").
" See Goodyear & Black, supra note 75, at 136 (describing how one academic
library's attempts to improved awareness of staff harassment by clients, including
sexual harassment, and procedures designed to facilitate report and pursuit of
harassers, but how these attempts were hampered because "[diespite all our ef-
forts, we still live in an environment where harassment is viewed by some as a
minor irritation, not the serious problem that it is").
"' See id. at 136 (describing a series of "development sessions" that were initi-
ated to train library "public service staff' to deal with all harassment, especially
sexual harassment, by clients more effectively by learning "how to set aside the
guilt that accompanies being harassed or reporting an incident").
,o Cf JANETTE S. CAPUTO, THE ASSERTIVE LIBRARIAN 15-16 (1984) (discussing
the library stereotype of nonassertive behavior as a self-fulfilling prophecy which
prevents librarians from asserting all types of workplace rights).
'" See Goodyear & Black, supra note 75, at 134-35 (describing how often inter-
actions between library staff and clients can be termed "harassment," frequently
including sexual harassment, and that these interactions could include "physical or
verbal abuse or coercion" which could be "subtle or overt," but that "it is often
difficult for staff members to determine if what they are experiencing is harass-
ment or just annoyance" and that "this particularly fine line makes it hard to
identify the scope and ownership of the problem").
92 Id. at 135.
," Will Manley, Are We Free to Talk Honestly About Intellectual Freedom?, AM.
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luctance would extend to acknowledgement of sexual harass-
ment resulting from client Internet use.
While libraries have not yet made a systematic study of
such incidents of staff exposure to Internet sexual content
which could lead to claims of third-party harassment,"4 the
anecdotal evidence is compelling. 5 A Kansas public library
reported repeated and seemingly deliberate staff exposure to
online sexual content by a client dubbed the "Coat Man":
LBR., Oct. 1992, at 112 [hereinafter Manley, Are We Free] (reporting that fear of
being branded a censor keeps library professionals from dissenting from the "pro-
fessional party line of giving children and young adults free and unfettered access
to every X-rated Web site," and that this fear is a powerful deterrent to honest
confrontation of library issues because "in library circles you're better off being
accused of being a mass murderer than a censor"); Will Manley, It's Time to Stop
the Hypocrisy, AM. LIBR., Nov. 1997, at 112 (describing how, in the context of the
debate over how unrestricted Internet access is allowing behaviors and access to
materials in the library that may be detrimental to children, anti-censorship advo-
cates among library professionals who often defend "giving 10-year olds access to
the hardest of the hard-core porn," the "First Amendment extremists," are begin-
ning to behave like censors themselves by dismissing honest discussion of valid,
child-protective concerns).
" Library commentator Will Manley, whose 1992 and 1993 surveys produced,
likely, the only available statistics of sexual harassment of library staff by patrons
so far, has predicted that libraries will begin to study their sexual harassment
problems more carefully. See Manley, No Laughing Matter, supra note 77, at 68.
Manley notes that despite anecdotal evidence of a widespread sexual harassment
problem in libraries, "[tihere is precious little information to be found anywhere,"
but "[that will change soon" as a result of heightened awareness of potential sex
crimes against library staff due to the murder of an Arizona public librarian who
was "brutally raped, before being stabbed more than 30 times with a paring
knife." Manley, No Laughing Matter, supra note 77, at 68. Manley admitted that
while his 1993 survey "can by no means be considered scientific it does dramati-
cally illustrate that sexual harassment by patrons is a serious problem for many
working librarians." Manley, Part Two, supra note 77, at 652.
9' One website tracked "incident" logs kept by various public libraries that
record incidents involving client use of Internet sexual content that are disturbing
to either staff or other library-clients. See Reports of Pornography, supra note 3.
While not devoted exclusively to staff complaints, and only anecdotally representa-
tive of all public libraries, approximately 3% of the incidents logged there involve
direct staff exposure to graphic sexual Internet images while at work (not counting
ambient exposure from walking by terminals). See Reports of Pornography, supra
note 3. The active monitoring performed by this website has recently been aban-
doned, and the site remains only as an archive. See Reports of Pornography, supra
note 3; see also Filtering Facts, Dangerous Access: The Epidemic of Pornography in
America's Public Libraries and the Threat to Children, at app. 2: Adults Harassing
Library Staff with Pornography (visited Nov. 13, 1999) <http'l/www.filteringfacts.
org/da-main.htm> [hereinafter Adults Harassing Library Staff].
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Yesterday the Coat Man appeared at Cedar Rose [library] and [staff
member] Laurie had a confrontation with him. He pulled the usu-
al stunt of calling staff (Laurie) over for equipment assistance and
leaving some naked bodies up on the screen. Laurie... asked him
to remove the material off the screen when asking for assistance
[from staff]. He then went into the access argument and eventual-
ly left. It appears he ... basically spends all his time going around
to metro libraries looking at porn and exposing our female staff,
and other females, to the porn he leaves up on the screen for them
to see.'
Also, in an internal staff memo, a San Francisco public library
reported that it had been having "some problems" with
"Internet users" viewing "hard-core pornography" on terminals
"close to and visible to the reference desk[s]" where staff are
stationed and that in such cases, security should be prompted
to ask these patrons to move out of view of the staff to more
"private" terminals.97 A librarian in a Maryland public library
reported that a client repeatedly attempted to engage her in
conversation, turned around to look at her while he used the
Internet, and was "bothering" staff "discussing the 'only soft-
core' pornographic pictures he is printing out."" Because of
this client's behavior, at least one female staff member at that
library attempted to schedule her hours so as to avoid coming
into contact with him.99 Other reports detail incidents of li-
brarians exposed to online sexual content by patrons printing
such materials at reference desk locations where library staff
administer central printers'00 or librarians exposed to such
content while assisting patrons in online search strategies
using machines offering no filtering of sexual content.101
96 Reports of Pornography, supra note 3 (quoting Internal Staff Memo from
Administration, Johnson County Public Library of Kansas, dated April 30, 1998).
,' Reports of Pornography, supra note 3 (documentation of internal staff memo
circulated at the San Francisco library, dated Aug. 12, 1997).
"Adults Harassing Library Staff, supra note 95.
See Adults Harassing Library Staff, supra note 95.
10 See Adults Harassing Library Staff, supra note 95 (report of young patron
printing "sexually explicit pictures" on a library printer located at a reference desk
at a Los Angeles public library); Keller, Printing & Porn, supra note 80 (staff
feeling that clients printing pornography visible to staff when staff must retrieve
images from a central printer is sexual harassment).
'o See Reports of Pornography, supra note 3 (detailing report by Library Direc-
tor of the Farmington, Michigan public library that a librarian was exposed to
online pornography while working with a mother and child on an Internet search
1999]
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While details of such incidents are not yet numerous in the
literature, especially as compared to client complaints of being
subjected to offensive exposure to online sexual content by
other clients, °2 such complaints are evidence of the circum-
stances in which staff, as well as clients, are routinely subject-
ed to exposure to online sexual content by clients. Moreover,
such incidents are characterized as objectionable enough to
give rise to complaining reports. 3 and, thus, may give rise to
library staff claims of sexual harassment by clients. Claims
will likely be limited, however, to those in which the staff can
show that the harassment was deliberate. As previously noted,
the Supreme Court has instructed that harassment under Title
VII "presupposes" intentional conduct. °4
Although actual reports of staff harassment at public li-
braries from client Internet display are still sparse in the liter-
ature, the most significant evidence of a growing problem
comes from assertions made by the libraries themselves, or by
the professional organizations which represent library inter-
ests. Statements indicating public library recognition of a prob-
for "wholesome" American Girls magazine where the librarian "typed in 'American
Girls'" during the search and, "[nleedless to say, she got a little more than she
bargained for"). Although this particular incident is an example of a likely unin-
tentional exposure, under certain circumstances, such search requests could illicit a
similar interaction in which it would be more difficult to ascertain whether con-
duct was intentional or not.
" Reports being logged by libraries of offensive client behavior using Internet
sexual content still overwhelmingly document client to client behavior, especially
that directed toward children. See, e.g., Complaint Log of the Multnoma County
(OR) Public Library (visited Nov. 25, 1998) <http://www.filteringfacts.org/mult.htm>;
Filtering Facts, Dangerous Access: The Epidemic of Pornography in America's Pub-
lic Libraries and the Threat to Children (visited Nov. 13, 1999)
<http:/www.filteringfacts.org/da-ha.htm>; Reports of Pornography, supra note 3;
Complaint Log of the Ft. Vancouver (WA) Public Library (visited Nov. 25, 1998)
<http'//www.filteringfacts.org/ftvan.htm>. However, much of the collection of such
data so far has been actively pursued by libraries and organizations only in the
context of obtaining evidence that access to online sexual content presents some
form of menace in the library, especially to children, to assist in legal battles
involving filtering and access rights to such content. The Reports of Pornography
website is maintained by an organization, Filtering Facts, which supports legal
challenges to libraries and statutes that allow unfiltered access to the Internet and
thus minor access to sexual content. See Reports of Pornography, supra note 3.
1"3 For example, one librarian sent a memo "to her manager stating that she
considers it a form of harassment that she has to deal with sexually explicit pic-
tures as part of her every day job." Adults Harassing Library Staff, supra note 95.
104 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2266 (1998).
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lem with staff harassment creating a sexually hostile environ-
ment have appeared in discussions led by the American Li-
brary Association's ("ALA") Freedom to Read Foundation'
and the ACLU' regarding all forms of potential public li-
brary liability resulting from providing access to Internet sexu-
al content. Moreover, the ALA was concerned enough about
potential library employer liability resulting from third-party
harassment to commission two legal memoranda on this issue
from a private law firm."7 Statements recognizing patron ha-
rassment have also appeared in pre-emptive Internet use poli-
cies that are distributed to clients and designed to warn clients
not to engage in such behavior and to attempt to insulate the
library from any liability. °8 These policies are further evi-
dence that libraries themselves believe there is a sexual ha-
rassment problem.
The Loudoun County, Virginia, public library is one library
system that has formally recognized in its Internet use policy
that client display of Internet sexual content poses a threat to
staff which could constitute sexual harassment.0 9 The Board
of the Loudoun County Public Library explicitly acknowledged
in its Internet use policy that a potential for harassment of
staff by clients using online sexual content existed and could
rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment for
their employees in violation of Title VII."0o The Loudoun
County policy as originally adopted states:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits sex discrimination. Library
pornography can create a sexually-hostile environment for patrons
or staff. Pornographic Internet displays may intimidate patrons or
106 See Jenner & Block, Civil Liability for an Alleged Hostile Work Environment
Related to Patron or Employee Internet Use: Memorandum (last modified Aug. 18,
1998) <http'/www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/work-jb.html> [hereinafter Jenner & Block,
Civil Liability].
106 See Censorship in a Box, supra note 1 (arguing that although staff exposures
exist, libraries would not be liable for a claim of sexual harassment).
" See Jenner & Block, Civil Liability, supra note 105; Jenner & Block, Civil
and Criminal Liabilities for Libraries Related to Using or Failing to Use Internet
Filtering Software or Other Content Screening Mechanisms: Memorandum (last
modified Aug. 18, 1998) <http'J/www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/civiUb.html>.
106 See supra note 83.
109 See Loudoun County Public Library Board of Trustees, Loudoun Country





staff .... Such displays would transform the library environ-
ment ... to one which invites unwelcome sexual advances and sexu-
al harassment. Permitting pornographic displays may constitute
unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.'
While this library policy was directed at protecting both "staff"
and other "patrons" from "sexually hostile" behavior by patrons
displaying "library pornography" in the form of online sexual
content, the policy was written in language explicitly mirroring
the elements that are required to sustain a sexual harassment
cause of action under Title VII." Additionally, the policy was
explicitly titled "Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment.""'
The policy also explicitly acknowledged that such behaviors
could fulfill at least two of the elements necessary to establish
a hostile work environment in a sexual harassment cause of
action including, behavior of a sexual nature toward staff, and
that the behavior is "unwelcome.""4 By writing its policy in
language directly evoking a hostile work environment claim,
the Loudoun County library has also acknowledged that, just
by permitting online sexual content displays by patrons, the
library employer could be implicated in a sexual harassment
cause of action brought by staff that rises to the level of
"Internet sexual discrimination" under Title VII."5
In fact, the Loudoun County public library originally
sought to avoid subjecting its staff and patrons to creation of a
"sexually hostile environment" by other patrons, and thus to
prevent such "Internet sexual discrimination.""6 Loudoun's
original policy advocated implementing preventive measures,
including installing "site blocking software" on all machines
and entirely prohibiting access to Internet "pornography" by all
patrons."' Additionally, in defending its Internet use policy
. Id. (emphasis added).
112 Id.
113 Id.
11. Loudoun County, Internet Use Policy, supra note 83; see also Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (detailing the elements of a hostile work
environment claim, including unwelcomeness).
... Loudoun County, Internet Use Policy, supra note 83.
116 Loudoun County, Internet Use Policy, supra note 83.
117 Loudoun County, Internet Use Policy, supra note 83. The ACLU successfully
challenged the Loudoun library's use of "site blocking software" as a preventive
measure against creation of a "sexually hostile environment" by clients and gar-
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in court against challengers who were opposed to mandatory
use of filtering software on all machines at Loudoun libraries,
the County expressly argued that one of its principal compel-
ling interests in formulating the policy was to prevent harass-
ment of both staff and clients by those clients viewing and
displaying Internet sexual content."8 Despite a lack of wide-
spread reports of staff harassment, anecdotal evidence, library
professional literature, and library policy statements reflect a
nered an injunction against enforcement of the policy on the grounds that filtering
violated the First Amendment. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 24
F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
In response to the ruling, the Loudoun library adopted a revised policy on
December 1, 1998, which reflected a dedication to freedom of access, allowed for
freedom for adults to choose filtering for themselves and their children, and re-
moved all reference to possible "sexually hostile" environments or "internet sexual
harassment." See Loudoun County Public Library Board of Trustees, Loudoun
County Public Library Internet Use Policy (visited Dec. 1, 1998)
<http.J/www.techlawjournal.com/censor/19981201pol.htm>.
11 This argument was ultimately rejected by the district court as justification
for the use of filtering software but, nonetheless, establishes the Loudoun library's
significant concern about the harassment of staff. The library's policy was invali-
dated by the court only because filtering software was seen as an insufficiently
narrow measure to serve this compelling interest without infringing free speech.
See Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 567.
The library acknowledged one librarian's failure to receive an overwhelming
response to an email request for incidents of staff harassment via client use of
Internet pornography. See id. at 566. However, it is generally acknowledged that
sexual harassment presents a complex human circumstance in which failure to
report incidents is not uncommon and is not necessarily an indication that harass-
ment is not occurring. See Radford, supra note 86, at 523-24 (reporting that only
five percent of targets file formal complaints against harassers and "both male and
female targets" do not tend to react to harassment by filing a formal complaint).
Also, the Virginia district court's pronouncement fails to take into account that the
Loudoun County library is not the only library entity that has expressed concern
about harassment in libraries, see supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text, or
that library staff may be feeling pressure to support First Amendment concerns
over their own well-being and thus underreporting. See Manley, Are We Free, su-
pra note 93, at 63. Further, as the anecdotal reports indicate, the lack of response
to this one email survey taken early on in the Internet presence in libraries does
not preclude the occurrence of harassing incidents. See supra notes 84, 95-103,
105-109 and accompanying text.
In early 1999, the librarian mentioned by the court, David Burt, filed free-
dom-of-information requests with libraries in an attempt to gain access to internal
logs of both client and staff complaints resulting from client use of Internet. See
Censorship Watch: David Burt Closes Down Filtering Facts, AM. LIBR., Jan. 2000,
at 25. Since then, Burt has threatened legal action against libraries that failed to
comply with the requests claiming either client confidentiality or that the library
did not have any "pertinent public records." Just the Filtering Facts, AM. LIBR.,
May 1999, at 20.
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recognition that client display of Internet sexual content to
staff is a cause for concern in public libraries which may result
in claims of third-party sexual harassment."9
III. APPLYING THE TIRD-PARTY HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
CLAIM TO CLIENT DISPLAY OF INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY IN
THE PUBLIC LIBRARY
As in other third-party hostile environment claims, to
prevail under Title VII, library staff will be required to show
that they were subjected to conduct of a sexual nature, that
the conduct was unwelcome, and that it was severe and perva-
sive enough to alter the condition of employment.' If suc-
cessful, the library employee will need to show further that the
employer knew or should have known of the harassing conduct
and failed to take appropriate and immediate remedial ac-
tion. 2 ' Additionally, claims may be limited to those where
staff can prove deliberate harassment by clients.'22 However,
library staff will also face a unique combination of challenges
in pursuing their claims, including for example, establishing
that pornographic Internet display alone is intentional conduct
based on the sex of the staff member, that it is sufficiently
severe alone to constitute harassment, that a public library
employer should not be able to shield itself with its First
Amendment responsibilities, and that an assumption of risk
defense should not apply where it is known that public library
work now contains a sexual component due to Internet pres-
ence. The following sections discuss these special, yet not in-
surmountable, challenges that library staff exposed to Internet
pornography by clients will face in fulfilling established param-
eters of liability under the hostile work environment and third-
party sexual harassment theories.
See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(a)-(d) (1980).
121 See id. § 1604.11(e).
12 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2266 (1998).
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A. Intent to Discriminate
While intent is not an element formally required to prove
a hostile work environment claim,' courts may nevertheless
require such proof because, as the Supreme Court has stated,
"Title VII discrimination presupposes intentional conduct.""
However, the Supreme Court recently may have made proving
intent easier in the context of pornographic Internet display
because the Court affirmed a finding of fact by a lower court
that it is unlikely that such content could be accessed uninten-
tionally.' In Reno, the Supreme Court reiterated undisputed
findings of fact made by a Pennsylvania district court regard-
ing sexually explicit content available on the Internet:
"[U]sers seldom encounter such content accidentally ..... 'Almost all
sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content.'
For that reason, the 'odds are slim' that a user would enter a sexual-
ly explicit site by accident. Unlike communications received by radio
or television, 'the receipt of information on the Internet requires a
series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely
turning a dial .. ,n126
Thus, it follows that if such images could not have likely been
accessed unintentionally, then a client working with a staff
member who affirmatively exposes that staff member to
Internet pornography likely did so intentionally. Additionally,
other courts have "presume[d] discriminatory intent.., from
the [simple] presence of sexually derogatory words and expres-
sion" in the hostile environment because the "economic dis-
placement and sexual degradation of its victims is so
strong."'27 These court findings, taken together, suggest that
a court would be predisposed to finding that display of Internet
pornography to library staff, which requires an intentional act
by a client to access it," inherently includes an intent to dis-
criminate in the workplace for the purposes of a hostile work
environment claim.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
12 Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2266.
See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2329, 2336 (1998).
126 Id. at 2334, 2336.
' Suzanne G. Lieberman, Current Issues in Sexual Harassment, 50 WASH. U.
J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 423, 437 n.99 (1996) (citation omitted).
128 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334, 2336.
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B. Discrimination Based on Sex
For sexual harassment to be actionable under Title VII,
which protects against sexual discrimination, the offensive
conduct must comprise discrimination based on the victim's
gender. 9 Conduct involving sexual behavior can be mistaken
as automatically fulfilling this gender requirement.3 0 Thus,
in library cases where the offensive conduct is made up only of
displaying sexually explicit Internet images to staff, but is not
accompanied by any further evidence that the conduct was
directed toward staff based on gender, this element could prove
difficult to establish, especially where both male and female
staff complain of exposure. As one district court explained,
"harassment which involves sexual behavior or has sexual
behavior overtones (i.e., remarks, touching, display of porno-
graphic pictures) but is not based on gender bias does not state
a claim under Title VII."'3 ' However, at least one circuit has
eliminated the need to establish gender bias as a separate
showing in cases involving behavior or materials of a sexual
nature."2 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
'" See Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D. Ind.
1995).
13 See Plakio v. Congregational Home, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1383, 1392 (D. Kan.
1995) ('The words 'sex' and 'sexual' create definitional problems because they can
mean either 'relating to gender' or relating to sexual/reproductive behavior. The
two are not the same, but are ... related and easily confused. Title VII only
recognizes harassment based on the first meaning." (citation omitted)).
The sexual nature of harassing behavior is not the basis of Title VII liability,
but whether the behavior is directed at a target because of gender. Cf Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding sexual harass-
ment where only female police officers were subjected to nonsexual harassing con-
duct, including stolen work product, vandalized property, and physical assaults);
see also Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harass-
ment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 813, 818-19 (1999) ("[Hlarassment [need not] have
included overtly sexual connotation; nonsexual conduct may be actionable if it
would not have occured but for the victim's sex."). However, sexual behavior is
considered by at least the Third Circuit as implicitly connoting harassment based
on gender. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1471-75.
131 Vandeventer, 902 F. Supp. at 1181 (afrming summary judgment for employ-
er where court found 'no evidence" that the abuse was based on harasser's "dis-
dain for the victim's gender" and only meant the harasser did not 'like" the vic-
tim, where the harasser taunted the plaintiff by calling him a "homosexual" and
that when the harassing co-worker called the plaintiff a 'dick sucker" he was
using a 'common epithet" and not making a 'sexual advance").
13 See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 & n.3.
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The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving
sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual
derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a
matter of course. A more fact intensive analysis will be necessary
[only] where the actions are not sexual by their very nature."'
Thus, in the library context where harassment involves the
display of pornographic or sexually explicit materials, it is
likely that the sexual nature of the materials would suffice to
establish the "sexual" and thus the gender-based nature of the
discrimination under the Andrews standard.'
C. Severity and Pervasiveness: The Dirty Picture Cases
Library staff plaintiffs may find the required degree of
severity suffered difficult to establish because in these circum-
stances it would likely be comprised of only pornographic im-
age display."' Courts have historically been reluctant to find
that exposure to pornographic imagery alone is sufficiently
severe and they ordinarily require some sort of additional
offensive conduct to sustain a claim."3 6 However, more recent
court decisions indicate that the tide may be turning and not
only will courts allow claims based solely on "dirty pictures" in
proper circumstances, 7 but they will allow evaluation of
such claims under the more sympathetic "reasonable woman
standard" in cases involving female plaintiffs,'38 consequently
133 Id.
13 Id.
13 Library harassment, however, like other workplace harassment, may include
a group of harassing behaviors which would likely make it easier to sustain a
claim. See, e.g., Adults Harassing Library Staff, supra note 95. One report made
by a Maryland librarian included both a person's display of pornographic images
to staff required to assist such person log on to "Netscape" and print, as well as
attempts by that person to engage staff in discussions of "soft-core pornographic"
images being printed. Adults Harassing Library Staff, supra note 95. These inci-
dents bothered two female staff enough that they attempted to schedule their
hours so as not to encounter this client while working. See Adults Harassing Li-
brary Staff, supra note 95.
13" See Discrimination-Free Workplace, supra note 2, at 1087 ("[Mlost courts
have cited pornography in the workplace as mere evidence of hostile environ-
ment .. . and have focused primarily on other aspects of harassing behavior, such
as offensive comments and sexist pranks.").
13 See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
138 Although not all circuit courts agree, see supra note 45, many courts have
adopted the reasonable woman standard in evaluating sexual harassment severity.
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increasing the likelihood of female staff claim success. Histori-
cally, courts have generally been unreceptive to the idea that a
hostile work environment claim could be founded on employee
exposure to "dirty pictures" alone." 9 However, such reluc-
tance is not universal. Some courts have recognized at least
the possibility that a hostile environment claim could succeed
based solely on employee exposure to sexually explicit imag-
es. 4 ° Additionally, some courts have denied summary judg-
ment to employers specifically on the grounds that such a
claim could survive as a matter of law and that the severity of
the individual exposure presents an issue of fact for the ju-
ry.'4 Moreover, at least two courts have found for a plaintiff
See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (reasonable woman stan-
dard applied where coworker sent letter of a sexual nature to plaintiff); Yates v.
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) ("person standing in the shoes of
employee should be the 'reasonable woman"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (reasonable woman standard ap-
plied to environment where jokes, remarks of a sexual nature, and pornographic
photographs were exchanged); see also Schneider, supra note 45, at 563 n.188 (ex-
plaining that the reasoning behind courts' adoption of reasonable woman standard
has been that male-biased reasonable person standard would perpetuate discrimi-
nation against women in the workplace); Ellen M. Martin et al., Recent Develop-
ments in Sexual Discrimination, 441 PLI/LIT 647, 661 (1992) ("Although courts
have generally examined hostile workplace claims from the perspective of the 'rea-
sonable person' . . ., several courts have held recently that ... the trier of fact
must adopt the perspective of the 'reasonable woman'" where the plaintiff is fe-
male.).
... See Discrimination-Free Workplace, supra note 2, at 1076.
"o See Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 640-41 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that
state statute restricting employee access to sexually explicit materials on state
owned computers violated the First Amendment where statute failed to cover non-
computerized ways of producing the hostile environment such as posting of "pin-
up" pictures); Iannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 403, 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (supporting retaliatory discharge claim where plaintiff "reasonably believed
that employer's requiring her to work with allegedly sexually explicit photograph
constituted sexual harassment in violation of Title VII"); see also Karen Lebacqz,
Essay, Justice and Sexual Harassment, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 605, 610 (1993) ('[The
law began to recognize that pornography in the workplace could constitute sexual
harassment."); Salime Samii, Litigating Federal Sexual Harassment Cases: The
Link Between 'Sexual Harassment" and the Standard of Reasonableness, 13 REV.
LITIG. 331, 351 (1994) ("[Tlhe posting of pornographic pictures or even cartoons
has been deemed to create a sexually hostile environment . . ").
141 See Flom v. Waste Management, Inc., No. 95-1924, 1997 WL 137174, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1997) (relying on the reasoning of Baskerville v. Culligan Inter-
national Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995), which held that offensive conduct
was insufficiently severe because it could appear on "primetime television," and
thus denying summary judgment to employer because "[p]rime-time television does
not show cartoons depicting sexual acts between human beings and animals and
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under this circumstance. 42
One court established liability based on the standard that
any sexually explicit material to which the employee was ex-
posed could not be found on "prime-time" television and thus
was sufficiently severe to establish the employer's liability for
creating a hostile work environment. Under this "prime-
time" standard, it would likely be easy to establish that a li-
explicit drawings of sexual organs or sexually offensive conduct" or "dirty pictures"
to which plaintiff was subjected); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp.
569, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (disagreeing with Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805
F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986), which held that pornography in the workplace does
not provide basis for hostile environment claim and that whether employer's dis-
playing of sexually explicit slide show and calendar featuring pictures of nude and
partially naked women was sufficiently pervasive to establish harassment was "a
question of fact which must be determined at trial"). But see Vigil v. City of Las
Cruces, 113 F.3d 1247, No. 96-2059, 1997 WL 265095, at *2 (10th Cir. May 20,
1997) (granting summary judgment to employer where employee's "single encounter
with pornographic material left inside a folder by a previous worker and her
supervisor's single attempt to give her pornographic software [were] not reasonably
regarded as giving rise to an abusive environment").
1 See Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, No. 91-1507,
1993 WL 551450 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1993) (granting application for attorney's fees
to plaintiff who prevailed in obtaining order enjoining union from creating a hos-
tile work environment by promotion and display of calendars that included pic-
tures of nude women and by failure to take action when female plaintiff com-
plained about the calendars). Although the harassing conduct in question in Robin-
son v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493-536 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
included additional behavior such as verbal harassment, Robinson is considered by
commentators to be the first decision to find a hostile environment "primarily
because pictures of nude and partially nude women appeared throughout the
workplace." Evelyn Oldenkamp, Pornography, The Internet, and Student to Student
Sexual Harassment: A Dilemma Resolved with Title VI and Title 1X 4 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POLY 159, 165 n.46 (1997); see also Thomas D. Brown, When Coun-
seling Is Not Enough: The Ninth Circuit Requires Employers to Discipline Sexual
Harassers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 916 n.107 (1993) ("The Robinson court heard
and accepted expert testimony explaining the detrimental effects of sexual stereo-
typing on the workplace and linking the sexually explicit pin-ups to the abusive
and demeaning attitudes of the other workers [and] . . . expand[ed] hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment to include pornography in the workplace."); Michael E.
Collins, Comment, Pin-Ups in the Workplace-Balancing Title VII Mandates with
the Right of Free Speech, 23 CUMB. L. REv. 629, 638 (1993) ("In Robinson ...
the ... District Court ... indicated that nude pictures in the workplace would
be sufficient to support an action under Title VII and that injunctive relief would
be proper."); Discrimination-Free Workplace, supra note 2, at 1076.
143 Flom, 1997 WL 137174, at *7. The court based its "prime-time" standard on
the reasoning of an earlier case, Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d
428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995), which had denied liability predicated in part on exposure
to pornographic materials because all of the offensive materials, "dirty pictures,"
and conduct could not be seen on "prime-time" television. Id.
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brary employee's exposure to the kind of images readily avail-
able on the Internet constituted sufficiently severe conduct.'"
Thus, there is evidence that the traditional notion that expo-
sure to "dirty pictures" alone is not severe enough to reason-
ably support a hostile environment claim is changing, and
library staff plaintiffs will benefit from this change. Such
plaintiffs will likely no longer need to establish that the type of
conduct to which they were subjected-image exposure-is suffi-
cient to support a claim as a matter of law. Rather, such plain-
tiffs can concentrate on establishing whether the circumstanc-
es of exposure were reasonably severe enough to sustain the
claim as indicated by factors such as frequency of exposure and
the offensiveness of the image displayed.'45
Both a court's decision whether to allow the legal sufficien-
cy of a claim predicated on "dirty pictures" alone and a court's
subsequent evaluation of whether the individual circumstance
of exposure was reasonably severe enough to sustain a claim
may be dependent upon whether the court chooses to apply a
reasonable person or a reasonable woman standard in cases
involving female plaintiffs. In fact, the case most often cited as
establishing that a claim predicated solely on exposure to sexu-
ally explicit images is not sufficiently severe, Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co.,4 ' has been criticized for its holding
specifically because of its failure to apply the reasonable wom-
an standard to a female plaintiff.'47 It is generally considered
'" For example, a recent survey of several pornographic website links emailed
unsolicited to the author as advertisements revealed the following sexually graphic,
arguably non-"prime-time," images shown on promotional screens: full frontal male
and female nudity, sexual intercourse, oral copulation, and multiple partner inter-
course. See Best Sex on the Internet (visited Nov. 28, 1999)
<http'//216.33.20.4/80s/7984651984316871/main/html>; Secret Adult 'Playground,
Watch the Pamela Anderson Home Sex Video Free! (visited Dec. 22, 1998)
<http//209.218.218.2/-crystals/entr.html>; Forbidden Sex Site (visited Dec. 28, 1998)
<http://208.166.75.251/88m/indexl.html>; Premium Pics, Mega XXX Playground (vis-
ited Dec. 30, 1998) <http-//www.premiumpics.com>. These images are freely accessi-
ble without age authorization requirements (despite warnings of prohibited minor
access) on promotional screens designed to induce a viewer to pay for additional
access, and thus should be available on any public terminal with access to the
worldwideweb, such as those at public libraries. See id.
14 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
140 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
147 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[I]n evaluating the
severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should focus on the perspec-
tive of the victim .... A complete understanding of the victim's view re-
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that the reasonable woman standard is more sympathetic to
female plaintiffs in sexual harassment claims and the reason-
able person standard more forgiving to employer defen-
dants.148 This is considered especially true with respect to
hostile environment claims involving sexually explicit imagery
because it can be shown that men generally are less predis-
posed to consider exposure to such materials as constituting
sexual harassment. 49
The choice of reasonable woman versus reasonable person
standard could have a significant impact on the success of
library staff claims because it is likely that most library claim-
ants would be female. According to one survey, female staff are
overwhelmingly the target of all sexual harassment by clients
in libraries.50 Thus, in the likely majority of cases where the
quires ... an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women. Conduct
that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women."); Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting Rabidue's
use of reasonable person standard and finding that while men may find use of
derogatory and insulting terms or posting of pornographic pictures "harmless and
innocent, it is highly possible that women may feel otherwise"); Atwoood v. Biondi
Mitsubishi, No. 92-1851, 1993 WL 244063, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 1993) ("This
Court joins the Third Circuit and a chorus of courts and legal scholars in rejecting
the 'boys will be boys' defense to sexual harassment claims.").
"' See Achampong, Recent Developments, supra note 33, at 652 ("The evaluation
of a hostile work environment from the perspective of a reasonable woman made
it more likely for a female plaintiff to win a third party hostile environment ha-
rassment claim, because women view sexual harassment differently from men.").
. In Robinson, the court accepted the testimony of an expert who established
that "[m]en and women perceive the existence of sexual harassment differently"
and that one study found that 87% of women consider conduct such as "materials
depicting sexually provocative poses, nude, and partially nude pictures" sexual
harassment, whereas only 76% of men consider this same material as constituting
sexual harassment. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1507 (M.D. Fla. 1991); see also Deborah S. Brenneman, Comment, From a
Woman's Point of View: The Use of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1295 (1992) ("[W]hile the male co-
workers in Rabidue, and in countless other workplaces around the country may
have characterized the plethora of pornography as amusing, the reasonable woman
would likely describe it ... as a barrier to gaining an equal footing in the
workplace.").
150 See Manley, No Laughing Matter, supra note 77, at 68 (78% of female re-
spondents and only 7% of male respondents to library survey had been sexually
harassed by a client in a given 12-month period). It should be noted that this
study only surveyed professional librarians, so the numbers for general library
staff may prove somewhat dissimilar. However, even taking into account that pos-
sible discrepancy, and accounting for an additional possible differential between
non-professional male and female staff perceiving the same activities as harass-
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library claimant would be female, the plaintiffs likelihood of
success in establishing severity could benefit from the courts'
increasing acceptance of a reasonable woman standard. 1 '
Consequently, because of the courts' increasing acceptance of
pornographic display alone as sufficiently severe to establish
harassment, and because of the courts' increasing employment
of a reasonable woman standard, library staff should be able to
establish the severity of a claim subject to no more than the
same reasonableness inquiry into the circumstances of each
claim than are all other sexual harassment claims.
D. Library Employer Must Have Constructive or Actual
Knowledge
As in other third-party sexual harassment claims, courts
may pay particular attention to the amount of knowledge that
a public library employer has of clients exposing library staff to
Internet pornography.'52 Actual knowledge, as in all hostile
environment claims, is satisfied by proof of direct complaints
from employees. 5 ' However, public libraries typically operate
in a system of central management with branches comprised of
multiple layers of management."54 Therefore, as in other or-
ganizational environments dependent upon a web of central
management and subordinate supervisors, public library ha-
rassment cases involving actual complaints will raise questions
of how high that complaint must travel in management in
ment, see supra note 149 and accompanying text, the huge gap between female
and male harassment presented in this study, 71%, suggests the fact that women
experience more harassment than men in the library from clients.
151 See supra note 46; Achampong, Recent Developments, supra note 33, at 652.
512 See supra Part I.B.
See Warner, supra note 16, at 373-74.
' Public libraries in the United States and internationally are generally orga-
nized into a system consisting of a single central or main branch with a central
administrative authority that is removed from the day to day operation of subordi-
nate branch library units. Often there is a mid-level regional authority as well.
The lowest organizational unit, the branch, generally has its own branch manager
who acts as the primary supervisor of workers and maintains authority over the
day to day library business. See, e.g., Thomas Ballard, Library Systems: A Concept
That Has Failed Us, WILSON LIBR. BULL., Dec. 1985, at 19-22 (studying examples
of system models of public librarianship in the United States, including the
main/regional/branch system model, the main and supporting branch system model,
and municipal stand-alone branch model).
[Vol. 65:3
9NTERNET PORNOGRAPHY IN THE LIBRARY
order to impute liability to the central employer.'55 Some
courts have held that complaints made only to a "lower level"
of management are insufficient to attribute actual knowledge
to the central employer. 5 ' Determination of knowledge may
also turn on whether the employee to whom the complaint is
made is reasonably vested with some authority to either reme-
dy the harassment or to relay the information to proper central
authority.15
7
However, in Faragher, the Supreme Court recently over-
turned a similar ruling that denied employer liability where a
subordinate supervisor had failed to report complaints of ha-
rassment to a higher authority.5" This suggests that the
Court no longer considers analysis of whether a complaint has
reached the proper management heights appropriate in deter-
mining liability.' Thus, after Faragher, public library em-
ployers should no longer be able to shield themselves by argu-
15 See Stanford Edward Purser, Young v. Bayer Corp.: When Is Notice of Sexu-
al Harassment to an Employee Notice to the Employer?, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 909,
910-11 (discussing the relative lack of scholarly attention focused on the significant
factor of how high in management notice must travel for sexual harassment lia-
bility to attach and noting that "determination of which employee's notice of sexu-
al harassment can be deemed notice to the employer is often the key determining
employer liability"); Warner, supra note 16, at 373-74 (noting that actual knowl-
edge may be established by proof of an employee complaint to 'higher manage-
ment") (emphasis added).
.5. Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 710-11 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that reports to immediate supervisor of co-worker's lewd sexual remarks
where supervisor did not inform superiors were too "low level" to impute knowl-
edge to employer); see also Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 506-07 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that reports of co-worker harassment made to highest ranking supervisor
on a postal shift by deaf mute incapable of communicating to any other postal
employees or managers were insufficient to impute knowledge to the necessary
"management level," and thus, Postal Service not liable).
"' See Purser, supra note 155, at 910-11 (noting one court's reasoning for at-
taching the liability to an employer in absence of complaint to a high management
authority was based on employee's reasonable expectation that the person to whom
she complained would either terminate the harassment or report it to someone
who could).
'" See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). The Eleventh
Circuit had denied the City of Boca Raton's liability for a supervisor's harassment
of a lifeguard where the lifeguard had informed another supervisor of being
touched in a "sexually offensive manner," and the informed supervisor never re-
ported the complaints to any higher authority. See Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1538 (l1th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2294 (1998)
The court of appeals held that the city could not be held liable because the in-
formed supervisor "did not rank as higher-management in the City." Id.
... See Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1538.
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ing that complaints failed to reach a high enough level of su-
pervisory authority, and staff complaints to any supervisor or
branch manager will likely now suffice to impute knowledge to
the library.
It has also been recognized that the amount of construc-
tive knowledge a customer service employer has of harassment
can be difficult for a complainant to show because the site of
harassment and the site of management activities are not the
same.160 However, this is largely a concern in situations
where an employee has been dispatched to a client's location
and is no longer within the property of the employer. 6' Al-
though library staff often work with clients in areas that are
remote from supervisory work areas, even the most remote
public location of the library is still within the real estate sys-
tem of the employer with on-site employer management. 162
Thus, this concern should provide no obstacle to library staff
claims of sexual harassment.
E. Employer Remedial Action: The 'Access Argument" Provides
No First Amendment Defense to Employer Remedial
Responsibility
Once a staff claimant has shown that a public library
employer had sufficient knowledge of harassment by clients
displaying Internet pornography, the claimant will need to
further show that the library failed to take immediate correc-
tive action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. 3 In
professional discussions of problems resulting from client
Internet use in libraries, much has been made of the fear that
16 See Warner, supra note 16, at 374.
161 See id.. But see Mathews, supra note 4, at- 996 (-Third party sexual harass-
ment inside the work environment can be just as hard to detect as discovering it
outside of the work environment.").
162 Cf. Ballard, supra note 154, at 19-22.
16 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1980) (describing the knowledge and remedial
action elements of the hostile work environment claim). Courts have required that
the remedial action taken by the employer needs to be instantaneous enough and
effective enough to offer some real protection to the worker, it cannot be a token
effort made too late. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. The level of
action required and the speed with which it must be taken are determined rela-
tive to the character of the harassment itself; as seriousness increases, so increas-
es the level of action and speed required. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text.
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instituting any protective measure that would inhibit clients'
First Amendment rights of access to the protected Internet
content. Potentially, library employers could take advantage of
this tension and attempt to use it as a shield against charges
that the library failed to take appropriate remedial action. This
defense is known among libraries as "the access argument,"
and even library clients seem to grasp its power to call into
question any prophylactic measures taken by a library, no
matter how justified, that might restrict access to library mate-
rials, including Internet pornography, which are perceived as
protected absolutely by the First Amendment."M However,
the Supreme Court has never held that First Amendment
protections are absolute in the face of sufficient countervailing
community interests.'65 Rather, under the "secondary effects"
doctrine, the Court has allowed restrictive measures that are
not intended to restrict access to protected content itself, but
only to curtail an attendant circumstance or behavior, known
as a secondary effect, that happens to be linked with a particu-
lar type of content incidentally.'66 The court allows such re-
strictive measures even where they have the effect of restrict-
ing access to the protected content itself.
6 7
The desire to control the intentionally harassing client
display behavior directed at library staff is a desire to control
behavior which is only incidentally linked with the protected
Internet pornography speech. It is a desire to control the sec-
ondary effect of access to Internet pornography and not a de-
sire to restrict the pornography itself.'68 Therefore, library
164 The "Coat Man" when confronted by library staff for repeatedly harassing
them made just such an argument when he was told to desist from requesting
staff assistance with pornographic materials. See Reports of Pornography, supra
note 3. Notations of clients attempting this argument to rebuff staff suggestion
that the client refrain from display behavior are not infrequent in the logs of
client complaints. See Reports of Pornography, supra note 3.
16 See Drew Patrick Gannon, Note, First Amendment Public Forum Analysis:
Restrictions on the Right to Receive Information Upheld in Kreimer v. Bureau of
Police, 97 DICK. L. REV. 411, 414 (1993) (citing R. Allan Homing, The First
Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931, 947).
16 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2342 (1997) (reiterating the Renton holding).
167 See id.
16 The Loudoun County library expressed this in its original Internet use policy
and argued the point in the case that challenged the validity of its policy. See




employers should be able to take whatever measures are nec-
essary to remedy harassing behavior without disturbing any
protected First Amendment access in the library.169 Conse-
quently, the First Amendment "access argument" should pro-
vide no shield for library employers against their need to
take effective and immediate remedial action in the face of
staff harassment.
F. The Secondary Effects Doctrine
The secondary effects doctrine developed when the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that speech activity may be com-
prised simultaneously of protected speech and non-speech
conduct, and that the accompanying non-speech conduct com-
prises a "regulable evil."7 ' This regulable evil later came to
be known as a "secondary effect" of the speech.'7' Four Su-
preme Court decisions are known to have shaped the modern
doctrine,'72 including United States v. O'Brien,'73 Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.,'" Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
1"9 Not every reaction accompanying speech can properly be characterized as a
secondary effect. In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), the Supreme Court clari-
fied what it had meant by a secondary effect in Renton, or more specifically, what
it had not meant to characterize as a secondary effect: psychological impact of the
speech itself on a listener. See id. at 320-22. Libraries seeking to control the affir-
mative harassing conduct of clients associated with clients receiving pornographic
to the speech is not the same as controlling an emotive impact on a listener or a
mere listener's reaction. The Mainstream Loudoun court failed to delineate this
separation adequately when it dismissed the secondary effects argument. See
Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
... United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1968).
171 The term "secondary effect" was first used in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976). While O'Brien never used the term
"secondary effect," its rationale is seen as the precursor to the Court's subsequent
rulings in Young and Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (plural-
ity opinion), two cases known as establishing the "secondary effects" analysis be-
yond the realm of "symbolic speech." Philip J. Prygoski, The Supreme Court's "Sec-
ondary Effects" Analysis in Free Speech Cases, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 1, 3-4, 7-8
(1989); see also William L. Mitchell, II, Comment, 'Secondary Effects" Analysis: A
Balanced Approach to the Problem of Prohibitions on Aggressive Panhandling, 24
U. BALT. L. REv. 291, 322-23 (1995).
172 See generally Mitchell, supra note 171; Prygoski, supra note 171.
173 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'74 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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Inc., 17 5 and more recently, Boos v. Barry.176 An analysis of
the development of the doctrine in these four cases reveals two
important reasons why it will properly apply to library at-
tempts to curtail sexual harassment incidentally tied to pro-
tected Internet pornography. First, the Supreme Court is espe-
cially likely to extend the doctrine's permissive restrictions in
the case of sexual speech as opposed to cases of political
speech.177 Second, as long as the effect to be controlled is not
the mere "emotive" reaction of the listener of speech, the doc-
trine applies.178  As the desire to control sexual harassment
in libraries fits both of these characteristics because it involves
sexual and not political speech, and because controlling sexu-
al harassment of staff is not designed to remedy a mere emo-
tive objection by staff to the presence of the Internet pornogra-
phy, the doctrine is likely to apply and to permit libraries to
institute restrictive measures directed toward client harass-
ers who happen to use Internet pornography as only a tool
of harassment.
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court originated what later came
to be known as the secondary effects doctrine in the political
context of a draft card burning case.179 Therein, the Court
first recognized that an act of burning the draft card, which
the plaintiff argued was "symbolic speech," could be made up of
both a protected speech activity, the message of protest made
by burning the card, and a non-speech activity, the destruction
of the card.80 The latter non-speech activity comprises a "reg-
ulable evil."' 8 ' The Court then ruled that a federal regulation
which prohibited the burning of a draft card was constitutional
as to the man who burned his card in protest.'82
The Supreme Court's next application of the secondary
effects doctrine to allow regulation of protected speech occurred
in Young, where a city had zoned "adult theaters" out of cer-
'7' 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
176 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
177 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 n.2 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 70).
'78 Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
179 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 372 (1968).
S Id. at 376.
.Prygoski, supra note 171, at *4.
'" See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 372.
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tain locations because of its desire to control not the viewing of
the films themselves, but to limit undesirable conduct and
effects which resulted from the theaters' existence, such as
crime." 3 The Court noted that the city had based its desire to
regulate the adult theaters on findings that crime and other
negative secondary effects were shown to be linked incidentally
to the occurrence of adult theaters in a given neighborhood,
but not to neighborhoods with theaters showing other types of
films." The Court then upheld the ordinances as an example
of "innovative land-use regulation implicating First Amend-
ment concerns only incidentally and to a limited extent.""
The Court first fully articulated the modern "secondary
effects" doctrine in Renton, another case in which the Court
upheld the zoning regulation of adult movie theaters to control
incidental effects such as crime and lowered property val-
ues."'86 Notably, the Court reiterated a distinction it felt had
been made earlier in Young between the stringency with which
application of the secondary effects doctrine should be withheld
in the contexts of political speech, but a more liberal applica-
tion of the doctrine applies to sexual speech. 8 ' On the appro-
priateness of allowing the zoning of adult theaters to prevent
secondary effects, the Court stated: "[It is manifest that
society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in un-
trammeled political debate.... .""s The Court reasoned that
the regulation of the theaters was allowable because it was
aimed "not at the content of the films shown at 'adult motion
picture theatres,' but rather at the secondary effects of such
theaters on the surrounding community."'89 The Court also
1" Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
18 See id. at 71 n.34; see also Prygoski, supra note 171, at *9.
18 Young, 427 U.S. at 73.
" Although the Court first used the term "secondary effects" in Young, Renton
represents its first full articulation of the doctrine's application. See Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34; see also
Prygoski, supra note 171, at *5, *8 ("Although the Court in O'Brien never used
the "secondary effects" parlance, its analysis is functionally indistinguishable from
that used by the Court two decades later in Renton and Boos.").
" See Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 n.2; see also Prygoski, supra note 171, at *18
(noting that Justice Rehnquist quoted the plurality in Young in his majority opin-
ion in Renton).
18. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 n.2 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 70).
"' Id. at 47.
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explained that it based its reasoning on its earlier holding in
Young that, as regulations of effects shown to occur incidental-
ly to a particular type of speech content, secondary effects
could be analyzed as "content-neutral" regulations despite their
seeming targeting of a particular type of content.'
In the most recent substantial secondary effects decision
by the Supreme Court, Boos v. Barry,9' the Court reaffirmed
the logic of allowing permissible restriction of secondary ef-
fects, although such restrictions appear to be targeted at a
particular type of speech.'92 The Court noted that because of
the simultaneity of both protected speech activity and non-
speech activity, the Court had been able in the past to uphold
regulation of such speech activity under the First Amendment
because it is seen as "content-neutral."'93 The Court then ex-
plained that restrictive regulation applies to a "particular cate-
gory of speech [only] because the regulatory targets happen to
be associated with that type of speech."" The Court declined
to apply the doctrine to the Boos facts which involved a restric-
tion of political picket signs in front of embassies.'95 Howev-
er, the Boos decision was made on the basis of political speech,
and thus presents an example of the Supreme Court's own
recognition that it would be less likely to extend the secondary
effects doctrine to regulations on political speech than to
speech such as might be found in an adult movie theater.9 '
In Boos, the Supreme Court also made clear that the rea-
son it declined to allow the regulation of picketing was that the
effect the District of Columbia sought to regulate was not a
proper secondary effect, such as "congestion," "interference
with ingress or egress," "visual clutter," the "need to protect
security of embassies," or the crime effect indicated in Renton,
but rather the attempt merely to protect the "dignity" of some
diplomats.'97 The court further explained that had the regula-
tion in Renton been grounded on a desire to restrict the "psy-
190 Id. at 49 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 70).
191 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
193 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 312.
19 Id. at 318-20.
" Id.
'9 See id. at 321.
" See id.
:" Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-23.
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chological damage it felt was associated with viewing adult
movies, then analysis of the measure as a content-based stat-
ute would have been appropriate."'98 The Court reasoned that
unlike Renton, the Boos ordinance presented an attempt to
restrict an effect of picketing speech in the form of a mere
"listener's reaction" to that speech created by its purely psycho-
logical "emotive impact" which comprised merely an affront to
the "dignity" of diplomats.'99 The Court then concluded that
the District of Columbia ordinance sought to restrict only a
psychological effect of speech on the listener diplomats, not a
secondary effect, and could thus properly be seen as a "content-
based" restriction in violation of the First Amendment.2
The lesson learned from this line of secondary effects cases is
that the Court is far more willing to permit restrictions af-
fecting sexual speech, and the Court is willing to restrict such
speech in the context of a crime-like effect incidental to a cer-
tain category of speech, so long as that effect does not repre-
sent a mere psychological impact on a listener of speech with
which she objects. 0 '
G. Secondary Effects in the Library
Four recent court decisions seem to indicate that library
staff could have reason to fear that the library employer will
argue the First Amendment defensively in opposition to a
charge that the library failed to remedy sexual harass-
ment.0 2 These four decisions seem to communicate that
courts value library access over attempts to mitigate harassing
behaviors within the library. In Reno v. American Civil Liber-
ties Union,"0' the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of
the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") which would have
held libraries criminally liable for failing to prevent a minor
198 Id. at 321.
199 Id. at 320-21.
200 Id.
21 See supra Part IV.F.
20 See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of
Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998); American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki,
969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, No. 15266-4
(Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 23, 1997).
203 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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from accessing sexual Internet content."4 In American Li-
braries Ass'n v. Pataki,2 5 a New York state court invalidated
a state statute similar to the CDA which would have imposed
similar liability on New York public libraries for failure to
restrict minors from accessing Internet pornography. 26 In
Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore,2°7 a court twice dismissed
civil claims made by a parent against a public library system
for its failure to prevent her child from accessing Internet
pornography."0 In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees
of the Loudoun County Library,2°9 a Virginia district court
enjoined a county public library system from enforcing an
Internet use policy specifically designed to guard against sexu-
al harassment of staff and patrons because the policy included
use of filtering software to block access to Internet sexual con-
tent on all public terminals.210 While only two of these cases,
Reno and Mainstream Loudoun, were actually decided on First
Amendment grounds, 21' all four decisions taken together
could indicate that, as a policy concern, courts may value
clients' access rights to public library materials and buildings
significantly over efforts to safeguard the safety and security of
either staff or other clients.2'
204 Although public libraries were not the only information providers exposed to
liability under the CDA, they were one of the principal sponsors of litigation and
one of the principal sites at which the sponsors of the suit were concerned about
restricted access to the Internet as a result of the CDA. See id.; see also supra
note 10 (explaining the purpose of the CDA).
206 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
200 See id. at 160.
207 No. 15266-4 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 23, 1997).
206 See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 17. The plaintiff in Kathleen R. subsequently
filed an appeal in March of 1999. See supra note 11.
206 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
210 See id. at 552.
211 In Pataki, the court declined to reach the merits of the First Amendment
challenge to the New York statute which would result in reduced or no Internet
access at libraries, instead invalidating the statute because it violated the Com-
merce Clause. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160. But in so doing, the court indicat-
ed that it would likely defer to the Supreme Court's decision in Reno on the First
Amendment question since the New York statute and the CDA were so similar
despite legislative attempts by New York to avoid the CDA's fate. See id. at 183
(finding that the New York statute was "clearly modelled" on the CDA). The
Livermore case was dismissed without reference to any First Amendment defensive
arguments and so lacks any discussion of that issue. See Goldberg, supra note 11,
at 17.
212 See supra note 202.
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However, another recent decision, Kreimer v. Bureau of
Police for the Town of Morristown213 -which involved a cir-
cumstance more directly analogous to sexual harassment of
staff by clients than the desire to protect children from access-
ing pornography-the Third Circuit held that public libraries
could take measures which effectively restricted a client's ac-
cess to a public library building. The court did so despite a
previous holding that access to a public library building, like
access to library materials, is a right protected by the First
Amendment.214 In Kreimer, the court upheld the constitution-
ality of a New Jersey public library's patron behavior
policy."215 The policy was challenged by a patron after he was
ejected from the library under the policy for his disruptive
behavior and extraordinarily offensive odor that interfered
with staff performance of certain duties.2"6 The court of ap-
peals found that the public library is a "limited-purpose" public
forum and, as such, is allowed to exercise the government's
right to exert "time, place and manner" restrictions on First
Amendment rights to balance community interests.217 Thus,
the Kreimer decision indicates that, despite four cases resolved
in favor of protecting rights to Internet access at public librar-
ies, courts may require libraries to limit such access in the face
of staff harassment and may hold libraries liable when they
fail to do so.2" 8
Both the Reno and Mainstream Loudoun courts recognized
that the secondary effects doctrine could allow restriction on
protected speech under proper circumstances.2 9 While both
courts ultimately rejected the secondary effects argument as
justification for restriction of access to Internet content,2
23 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
214 See id. at 1242.
215 Id.
216 See id. at 1246-49.
217 Id. at 1262.
211 See Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1242. Mainstream Loudoun centered on which mea-
sures might properly be taken by a library to protect children from accessing por-
nography on the Internet in libraries. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trust-
ees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998). Consequently, it is likely that the district
court gave very little effort to analysis of the library's minor argument that it also
desired to protect staff from harassment by using filtering devices.
29 See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2342 (1997) (reiterating the secondary
effects holding of Renton); Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (discussing
Renton's secondary effects analysis).
'2' See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342-43; Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at
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and the district court in Mainstream Loudoun did so even in
the face of the library's explicit argument that the library only
desired to prevent a sexually hostile environment for both
clients and staff,' only the Supreme Court's rejection in Re-
no conforms with proper application of the secondary effects
doctrine. An examination of the district court's reasoning in
Mainstream Loudoun as compared to the history of the Su-
preme Court's prior application of the secondary effects doc-
trine shows that the district court failed to accurately apply
the doctrine and should not have universally dismissed its
application under the circumstances of that case.2"
In Reno, the Supreme Court found that the CDA sought to
control the primary effect of access to a protected form of
speech on minors.2" Thus, the Court found that the "second-
ary effects" limitation would not apply at all."= Thus, the
Court failed to discuss the proper application of a secondary
effect restriction in the library context in any depthY How-
ever, the Court's distinction of the aim of the CDA, to prohibit
minor access to protected sexual Internet content altogether,
provides a useful illustration of how the Court sees the differ-
ence between primary effects and secondary effects. 6 The
statute in Reno sought to provide a restriction based on the
perceived detrimental impact directly on child listeners, a
primary effect of speech.2 7 Thus, the doctrine was properly
dismissed. Such was not the case in Mainstream Loudoun.
The district court in Mainstream Loudoun erred by relying
on Boos to justify its decision. Relying on Boos, the court decid-
ed not to apply the secondary effects doctrine to allow library
restriction of client access to Internet pornography." 6 This
564-65.
22 See Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 564-65.
222 See supra Part W.F.





See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564
(E.D. Va. 1998) ("The defendant's concern that without installing filtering software,
Internet viewing might lead to a sexually hostile environment is solely focused on
the reaction of the audience to a certain category of speech. As the Supreme Court
noted in Boos, this is not a secondary effect.").
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reliance represented a poor choice of precedent by the Main-
stream Loudoun court, which rather should have relied on
either of the two more analogous secondary effects Supreme
Court decisions in Young or Renton. There are two reasons
why the Mainstream Loudoun court improperly relied on Boos
rather than Young or Renton. First, Boos was a political speech
case with a higher threshold of doctrine applicability than
should have been applied in the context of Internet pornogra-
phy. As sexual speech cases, both Young and Renton are more
analogous to the Internet pornography circumstance at hand.
Second, the effects sought to be controlled in Young and
Renton, crime and declining property values, are far more
analogous to the sexual harassment effect that would be con-
trolled by public libraries than the emotive dignity of visiting
diplomats effect sought to be controlled in Boos. By
mischaracterizing staff objection to being subjected to affirma-
tive harassing behavior as mere "listeners' reactions to speech,"
the Mainstream Loudoun court improperly dismissed the appli-
cation of the secondary effects doctrine to library restrictions
on client Internet use. 9
A public library's desire to control acts of sexual harass-
ment by clients who happen to be using Internet sexual con-
tent as a tool of harassment that extends beyond the protected
right of reception is a desire to control more than the mere
emotive impact of the speech on staff. While the severe psycho-
logical impact of sexual harassment on its targets is well docu-
mented," ° it is widely recognized that sexual harassment
carries far more serious impact than a mere affront to digni-
ty." 1 Sexual harassment is not just an act of unpleasant com-
munication; rather, it is recognized as an act of violence and
power 2 2 that can inflict severe physical as well as economic
SId.
230 See, e.g., L. Camille Hdbert, The Economic Implications of Sexual Harass-
ment for Women, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLVY 41, 44 (1994) (documenting both the
psychological and economic effects of sexual harassment); Lynn Litow et al., Social
and Psychological Factors in Sexual Harassment: A Preventative Model for Compa-
nies, 426 PL/LIT 47, 49 (1992) (documenting some of the severe psychological
consequences of harassment on targets, including, "self blame, depression, anger,
disgust, sadness, and generalized anxiety").
231 See infra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal
Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249,
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consequences on the victim." s Sexual harassment also carries
with it severe economic consequences for the businesses that
fail to control such behavior because of "loss of productivity
252 (1998) ("[Dlominance theory present[s] an important theoretical framework
within which to understand the harms of violence against women in areas such
as.. . sexual harassment and pornography."); L.F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harass-
ment-Violence Against Women in the Workplace, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1070 (1993)
(documenting how sexual harassment constitutes violence in the workplace that
has profound job-related, psychological and health-related consequences); J. Larkin
& K. Popaleni, Heterosexual Courtship Violence and Sexual Harassment-The Pri-
vate and Public Control of Young Women, 4 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 213 (1994)
(studying the effect of sexual harassment and courtship on adolescent girls as two
forms of male violence and control); Michelle-Lewis Liebeskind, Preventing Gender-
Based Violence: From Marginalization to Mainstream in International Human
Rights, 63 REV. JlR. U.P.R. 645, 646-47 (1994), available in Westlaw (describing
that one provision of a women's convention, the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination of all Forms Against Women, which makes recommendations to
countries on human rights advises "that States include information in their reports
about sexual harassment as a form of violence and discrimination against wom-
en"); Litow, supra note 230, at 50 (describing how the psychological literature of
sexual harassment has borrowed from the literature of rape and that "some be-
lieve that sexual harassment is an expression of power"); C.S.K. Tang, Effects of
Gender and Profession and Type on Definitions of Violence Against Women in Hong
Kong, 36 SEX ROLES 837 (studying how over 90% of public service professionals
surveyed classified sexual harassment as a form of violence against women, but
among that group, men had a narrower definition of violence against women than
women).
It should be noted that most of these studies have been conducted within the
theoretical framework of sexual harassment perpetrated by men as a form of vio-
lence against women. See generally Bowman & Schneider, supra; Fitzgerald, supra;
Larkin & Popaleni, supra; Liebeskind, supra; Litow, supra note 230; Tang, supra.
However, just as courts have now recognized that sexual harassment can occur
between same sexes or as perpetrated by women against men, it is likely that at
least some of these study findings are as applicable to sexual harassment involv-
ing same sex or female perpetrators. See, e.g., Nancy L. Abell, Current Issues in
Sexual Harassment Law, CA35 ALI-ABA 153, 190 (1996), available in Westlaw
(reporting courts' recognition of same sex harassment).
2 See, e.g., Hbert, supra note 230, at 44 ("[A] [person] who is subjected to a
sexually charged working environment is likely to suffer economically as well as
psychologically .... [Tihe EEOC, in its March 1990 Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment, recognized the potential economic effects of hostile
environment harassment."); Richard C. Sorenson et al., Solving the Chronic Prob-
lem of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Empirical Study of Factors Affect-
ing Employee Perceptions and Consequences of Sexual Harassment, 34 CAL. W. L.
REV. 457, 459 (1998) ("[Slexual harassment constitutes '... a chronic occupational
health problem to which the public health and preventative medicine notions of
prevention may be applied.'); Kent D. Streseman, Note, Headshrinkers,
Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts & Sluts: Reexamining Compelled Mental Ex-
aminations in Sexual Harassment Actions Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1268, 1278 (1995) ("[Slexual harassment victims ... frequently
suffer loss of job status as well as psychic and physical harm.").
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due to morale and turnover problems."2" Thus, a public
library's intent to control a sexually hostile work environment
is far more analogous to the intent to control crime and de-
cining property values designated as proper justification for
secondary effect restrictions by the Supreme Court in both
Youngs and Renton.. than it is to the regulation of "emo-
tive impact" disallowed in Boos." As in O'Brien, Young and
Renton, the act of sexual harassment by a client can be seen as
a course of conduct which only happens to accompany the cate-
gory of protected speech activity-in this case the receipt of
Internet sexual content by a library client."' Thus, on these
facts, the court in Mainstream Loudoun should have followed
the reasoning of Young and Renton rather than Boos and ac-
knowledged a possible need for the library to control the sexu-
ally hostile work environment as a secondary effect of the
protected Internet pornography." When properly applied,
' Litow, supra note 230, at 49 (describing further that sexual harassment
"ha[s] significant consequences for both individuals and organizations," that "vic-
tims of harassment often quit, attempt to quit or transfer in order to escape the
situation," and that the "fiscal implications" of harassment for an organization can
be "staggering with total costs for replacing an employee (including hiring and
training) often exceeding the individual's annual salary"); see also Sorenson, supra
note 233, at 491 ("[Tlhe cost of sexual harassment to organizations can be sizable.
If not addressed, the problems may lead to a loss of productivity, decreased work-
er satisfaction, increased turnover and legal penalties."); Claudia Withers, Prevent-
ing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 587 PLI/LIT 109, 112 (1998) ("A Working
Woman study found that sexual harassment costs the typical Fortune 500 compa-
ny $6.7 million a year in increased absenteeism, employee turnover, low morale,
and low productivity."); Sally A. Piefer, Comment, Sexual Harassment from the
Victim's Perspective: The Need for the Seventh Circuit to Adopt the Reasonable
Woman Standard, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 85 n.7 (1993) ("Examples of the conse-
quences of sexual harassment include work disruptions, financial burdens for both
the employee as well as the employer . . ").
2' 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see also Prygoski, supra note 171, at *6-*10, *17-*19.
2 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see also Prygoski, supra note 171, at *16-*19.
'7 485 U.S. 312, 318-20 (1988); see also Prygoski, supra note 171, at *17-;119.
See supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
2' The author does not suggest that recognizing sexual harassment as a sec-
ondary effect should have led to the court affirming the Mainstream Loudoun
County library's policy of using "blocking software" as an acceptable method of
regulating the hostile work environment. The ineffectiveness of such filtering soft-
ware in successfully blocking access to sexual Internet content, and doing so with-
out blocking desirable, inoffensive content, is well documented and has been at the
center of the controversy surrounding use of such software. See Mainstream
Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 559-60 (E.D. Va. 1998) (dis-
cussing that library's use of one such filtering product, "X-Stop," known for block-
ing sites that do not contain sexual content). Rather, the Mainstream Loudoun
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therefore, the secondary effects doctrine should authorize a
public library employer to take measures to control the harass-
ing behaviors even where those measures might have the effect
of diminishing rights of access to protected Internet pornogra-
phy. The Kreimer court's allowance of restrictive measures
instituted by public library to prevent disruptive client con-
duct, even when those measures somewhat limit the client's
access rights, adds further support that the library is capable
of taking such restrictive measures based on harassing client
conduct.24 Consequently, public library employers will not be
able to shield themselves from full responsibility for taking
appropriate remedial action by pleading that their hands are
tied by the First Amendment, and Mainstream Loudoun should
offer no support for that position.
H. Assumption of Risk Defense
The specter of an assumption of risk defense to employer
sexual harassment liability has been raised before in at least
one class of third-party cases where the work itself involved
some component of a sexual nature,24 those cases involving
sexually charged restaurant and club environments. 2 As did
court should not have so easily dismissed the library's contention that it was enti-
tled to take measures that ordinarily would violate First Amendment right of
access to protected Internet content in the interest of controlling the sexually hos-
tile work environment as a secondary effect. The consequences of sexual harass-
ment are more analogous to other secondary effects, such as crime and declining
property values, which have been recognized by the Supreme Court in Young and
Renton, than they are to the "emotive impact" unconstitutionally restricted in
Boos, on which the district court seems to have erroneously relied. See supra notes
235-239 and accompanying text.
2" See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
24' This is in contrast to other work environments where the work itself is
entirely devoid of any sexual component, i.e., banks, insurance companies, manu-
facturing of non sex-related products, etc., where any conduct of a sexual nature
would be entirely inteijected by the harassers. See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1136
(distinguishing a case in which it would arguably conflict with the public policy of
Title VII to allow the assumption of risk defense where the workplace involved
solely non-sexual "oil refining").
24 See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1133-39 (reporting that the defense was raised
by Hooters restaurant in one suit against them and arguing that the defense
should be available wherever workers commodify their sexuality); Rhee, supra note
17, at 190-94 (noting that the "dicta of certain cases" suggests that courts are
open to the possibility of an assumption of risk defense in sexual harassment law
and that proponents of the defense argue that it should be available where work-
1999]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
one restaurant chain, the public library employer, might argue
that any staff claimants knowingly and voluntarily assumed
the risk of sexual harassment by agreeing to serve clients in
an environment where providing access to Internet materials
of a sexual nature is part of the job. However, this defense to
sexual harassment has yet to be sustained by a court.23 Its
viability is seen as "optimistic" at best by even those who advo-
cate its limited use in work environments that substantially
include purveying products or services of a sexual nature.2'
Consequently, because the work of public libraries does not
substantially involve working with Internet sexual materials,
and because stereotyping of libraries as non-sexual workplaces
will also prejudice the amount of sexual risk that might rea-
sonably be assigned to them by courts assessing applicability of
a risk defense, 5 public library staff claimants will likely pre-
vail over this defense. The discussion of potential for an
ers choose to "consent to commodify their sexuality at work," and arguing that the
defense should be available in environments where sex makes up a "substantial"
part of the goods and services offered).
243 The Hooters case in which the defense was raised ultimately settled without
a court determination as to the viability of the defense, see Rhee, supra note 17,
at 165, and "currently there is no assumption of risk defense in sexual harass-
ment law." Rhee, supra note 17, at 194.
2, Rhee, supra note 17, at 194.
24 One commentator made her point that women in the Hooters environment
voluntarily choose an extremely sexually risky environment by explicitly juxtapos-
ing the perceived high risk level of the Hooters environment with the relatively
low expectation one would presumably have of sexual risk in library environment:
"Essentially, the argument [for allowing the defense] contends that cocktail wait-
resses must expect and assume a certain sexual attention not expected nor tolerat-
ed, for instance, by librarians." Rhee, supra note 17, at 193 (emphasis added). Not
only did she make the point using librarians, but she evidenced the extreme prej-
udice that exists against thinking of libraries as sexually risky environments in
her explanation of how she derived the concept that certain work environments
carry less risk than others. See Rhee, supra note 17, at 193 n.151. She derived
the concept from two other scholars' development of a relative sexual risk rating
scale for different employment environments. See Rhee, supra note 17, at 193
n.151 (citing Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment by Em-
ployees of Employees by Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?,
21 PEPP. L. REV. 447 (1994)). Aalberts and Seidman's scale had placed "bookstore
employees" on the "low risk" end of the scale rating their sexual risk as a work
environment. Rhee, supra note 17, at 193 n.151. However, the commentator felt
that the bookstore imagery did not illustrate what constitutes a low sexual risk
environment evocatively enough, so she "chose to take their example one step fur-
ther to make my point most explicitly" and thus to use the library as an extreme
example of low risk. Rhee, supra note 17, at 193 n.151 (emphasis added).
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assumption of risk defense is not new to sexual harassment
law,"' but such a defense got its most practical legal consid-
eration when it was raised by a Hooters restaurant several
years ago." Hooters, a chain restaurant, famously serves a
highly sexualized environment along with its chicken wings
and beer."8 Hooters was sued by several waitresses in sepa-
rate suits in various cities after waitresses were subjected to
lewd behavior and sexual advances that the waitresses claimed
constituted a hostile work environment. 9 The waitresses
claimed the hostile environment was created by the Hooters
management "explicitly selling the sexuality of its Hooters
Girls." 0  In response to a suit filed in Minneapolis,
Hooters raised an assumption of risk defense." While that
Hooters case settled before the court could rule on the validity
of the defenseY2 Commentators have since advocated the
limited viability of such a defense in sexual harassment cases
involving sexualized work environments.253
Assumption of risk is borrowed from tort law and allows
that where a plaintiff "knowingly and voluntarily assumes a
risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of a
defendant," that plaintiff is "barred from recovery" from the
risk-assumed harm.' In the context of the Hooters claims,
the defense is argued to be justified because the sexually
charged atmosphere of Hooters is so well known and makes up
so much of the atmosphere of the Hooters business-in effect,
that atmosphere comprises the very substance of what attracts
24 See Rhee, supra note 17, at 192.
2'7 See supra note 242.
24 See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1131-33 ("[Slex appeal was a substantial part of
the product Hooters offered to its customers . . . ."). Hooters eventually adopted a
sexual harassment policy in which it admitted that "female sex appeal is an es-
sential ingredient of the Hooters concept." Cahill, supra note 5, at 1131 n.136
(citing Former Hooters Employees Fired for Not Signing Form, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 14, 1993, at B5). Hooters now requires waitresses to sign an affirmation of
their knowledge of and consent to this fact. See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1131
n.136.
2. See Rhee, supra note 17, at 164-65; Cahill, supra note 5, at 1108-09.
' Rhee, supra note 17, at 179.
221 See Rhee, supra note 17, at 191-92.
22 See Rhee, supra note 17, at 164.
See Rhee, supra note 17, at 164. See generally Cahill, supra note 5.




clients to Hooters as opposed to any other restaurants that
also serves chicken wings. 5 Consequently, it is argued that
any waitress who chooses to work at Hooters is well apprised
of the risk that she will be subjected to lewd comments and
sexually charged behavior by clientsY 6 Thus, in the Hooters-
like circumstance, a potential worker has a great opportunity
to foresee, and to have true knowledge of, the risk of exposure
to conduct of a sexual nature, thus satisfying the first element
of the defense.257
By contrast, library workers are robbed of any similar
opportunity to gain true knowledge of the risk of exposure to
any sexual content or conduct in their work environment for
two reasons.5 8 First, Internet sexual content is so new to li-
braries that its risks are not as evident as the risks associated
with Hooters.259 Evidence of staff exposure is not widely pub-
licized, and the library environment is not generally "known"
for either sexual conduct within its walls or its vast collections
of sexual content, as is Hooters.50 In fact, the library is so
stereotypically devoid of sexual risk that it has been used as
an example of the least risky end of the risk scale inapposite to
work environments such as Hooters and topless dance busi-
nesses.25' Thus, the risk of behavior of a sexual nature is not
so readily assessed upon initial inspection of the library work
" See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1131-32 (arguing that the defense elements of
knowing and voluntary assumption fit where it is "undebatable" that Hooters wait-
resses knew "sex appeal was a substantial part of the product Hooters offered to
its customers" when they decided to work there).
... See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1131-32.
257 See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1131-32.
" See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
... Access to the Internet in public libraries only became widespread in the last
three years. See supra note 8.
" Society carries a general prejudice that librarians and libraries are not sexu-
al entitites. See Will Manley, Facing the Public, WILSON LIBR. BULL., June 1992,
at 65 (describing a survey Manley developed entitled "Librarians and Sex" in order
to dispel the stereotype of librarians who "are not widely regarded as the sexiest
people," the response to which sparked off Manley's original inquiry into sexual
harassment at the public library). For a working example of this prejudice and its
potential effect on a library-sex risk assessment in the context of applying this de-
fense, see supra note 245 and accompanying text.
261 See Rhee, supra note 17, at 193 & n.151 (Rhee's modified sexual risk rating
of work environments list reads: 'topless dancer, high risk; cocktail waitress, mid-
level risk"; "libraries" in contrast are rated as "low risk"); see also supra note 245
(discussing Rhee's modification).
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environment. Second, sexual content is not substantially the
business of the library relative to that of Hooters.262 Also, li-
brary workers are not making a choice to market their own
sexuality by agreeing to work in an environment where sexual
content is available. So, even if a worker knows of some risk at
the library, the greatness of the risk nowhere near compares to
the percentage of risk perceived in an environment such as
Hooters where sex is a primary commodity sold along side the
food and drinks.'6 Thus, knowledge of the risk of exposure to
sexualized behavior is neither so easily gleaned by a worker
assessing the library environment as at Hooters, nor would
such risk be accorded as much likelihood of occurrence at a
library by those assessing the risk for the purpose of applying
the defense as is the risk in the context of Hooters.2
For the assumption of risk defense to apply, courts require
that the plaintiff have knowledge that includes a full apprecia-
tion of the nature, character and extent of the risk.21 Thus,
library staff are much less likely to satisfy the first element of
the defense which requires a truly knowing assessment of risk.
This is one area in which stereotypical prejudice against li-
braries seen as environments entirely devoid of sex will work
in the favor of library staff when courts assess the degree
of knowledge of risk workers could have had about sex in
the library.2
66
The newness of the Internet to libraries will also likely
destroy the perceived voluntariness of a worker's choice to
assume its risks. In the Hooters context, where a sexually
charged atmosphere has always been part of the employment
mix,267 the risk is not only voluntarily assumed by workers
but is actually responsible for attracting workers to that partic-
ular employment choice. 68 In contrast, the presence of
26 See Rhee, supra note 17, at 193 & n.151.
26 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
264 See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965).
2" See supra notes 8, 245, and 259.
26? See Rhee, supra note 17, at 180 ("From the moment Hooters opened, femi-
nist groups across the country targeted local chains in protest, voicing their opin-
ion that its display of waitresses in tight white tops and bright orange shorts
exploited women. Protesters meted out their condemnation to ... the patrons for
purchasing the commodity of women's sex appeal .... ").
26 One waitress who filed a harassment suit described her choice to work at
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Internet sexual content is so new to libraries that most work-
ers who have been employed for three to four years or more
could never have had an opportunity to consider its risks as
part of their employment choice.269 Thus, without adequate
opportunity for library staff to make a choice regarding risks
posed by the presence of Internet pornography in their job
environment, any exposure would likely be seen as an entirely
involuntary condition of employment.
Nevertheless, a court may still assign voluntariness to an
assumption of risk even if the risk was not actually factored
into an original choice by the risk bearer where she elects to
continue the risky behavior once fully apprised of its dan-
ger.Y7 However, even those library staff who exhibit suffi-
cient knowledge of risk and have voluntarily chosen to remain
employed may be judged as involuntary risk assumers. As a
policy matter, courts are reluctant to allow the assumption of
risk defense in any environment where the risk assumer pos-
sesses vastly unequal bargaining power to that of the defen-
dant who puts them at risk, such as an employment situa-
tion.' The unequal bargaining power raises serious concerns
about the true voluntariness of the choice. 2 Consequently, it
is unlikely that a court would determine librarians to have
voluntarily assumed risk in electing to remain at their jobs.
Hooters waitresses and other employees in the
club/restaurant environment enjoy a significant benefit from
their employment which is seen as restoring waitress bargain-
ing power2 73 to a degree not shared by library employees.
Hooters waitresses and their ilk choose to directly "commodify"
Hooters in terms of how their sexual sales "concept" enhanced her earning poten-
tial: "I loved the [Hooters] concept. If I can use my looks to make good money,
why shouldn't I?" Cahill, supra note 5, at 1132. Another described how she earned
"as much as $250 in tips ... at Hooters, compared to only $75 to $100 ... at
another national chain restaurant," but more importantly, she "enjoyed herself at
Hooters" because the sexual attention made her feel "attractive." Rhee, supra note
17, at 186 (citing Kirsten Downey Grimsley, Hooters Plays Hardball with the
EEOC Restaurant Chain's Orchestrated Anger in Bias Case Puts Pressure on Over-
burdened Agency, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1995, at HI).
26 See supra note 8.
270 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 (1965).
271 See id. § 496B.
272 See id.
272 See generally Cahill, supra note 5; Rhee, supra note 17.
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their sexuality.274 Such self-commodifying risk bearers gain
an extra financial advantage from their employment choice
that could tend to override courts' public policy concerns about
disparate bargaining power."' The extraordinary financial
benefit that these commodified workers enjoy is seen as offset-
ting the inequality of their bargaining power and thus justify-
ing imposition of the defense against them and those like
them.276 Even those who have argued in favor of the risk de-
fense only argue for its limited use in such sexually
commodified environments.7 As library workers enjoy no ex-
tra benefit from their employment choice,278 courts have no
such reason to disregard natural reluctance to impose the risk
defense on employees forced to choose between risky behavior
and their jobs.
Consequently, although sexual harassment claimants in
the public library environment have agreed to work in an envi-
ronment that provides a service with a sexual component, they
do not share the same degree of characteristics possibly seen
as justifying the defense in other environments such as Hoot-
ers. The risk of sexually harassing conduct is not so readily
See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1137-38; Rhee, supra note 17, at 180-94.
See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1119-20, 1138-39 (explaining that the same
public policy concerns that underlay the controversy over the allowance of the
assumption of risk defense also underlay Title VII's desire to eliminate discrim-
ination and that to disallow the defense where a woman has chosen to market her
sexuality in exchange for a "premium wage" and acceptance of risk would violate
Title VII's public policy and destroy all women's "freedom" to make their own
choices); Rhee, supra note 17, at 190-93 (explaining how proponents of risk accep-
tance in exchange for sexual commodification's financial rewards view workers who
make this choice as "wholly autonomous rational actors with freely exercisable
market rights" where such workers are simply exercising "choice and agency").
' See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1119-20, 1138-39.
z' See Cahill, supra note 5, at 1139 (arguing that the assumption of risk de-
fense should be used only where "sex appeal" is a "substantial part of the
employer's business" and of the workers' "particular jobs").
' Workers at all levels of public librarianship are generally underpaid. See,
e.g., Mary Jo Lynch, Librarians' Salaries: Barely Any Increase This Year, AM.
LIBR., Oct. 1, 1996, at 59 (discussing professional librarian salaries around the
country which generally hover in the low $30,000 range, even for professionals
with a number of years of experience and at least one masters degree); Beverly
Goldberg, Wisconsin Director Resigns, Citing Small Town Politics, AM. LIBR., Apr.
1, 1998, at 28 (describing an "exodus" of support staff from Wisconsin libraries in
part because of underpayment); Will Manley, Who Has the Best Page in




assessed in the library environment as in environments where
sex is one of the principal commodities or services. 7 9 Most
library staff will not have an adequate opportunity to make a
truly voluntary decision about working with the risk of expo-
sure by clients because bf inability to factor the risk into their
employment decision and unequal bargaining power.Y Final-
ly, unlike the Hooters cases, courts have no reason to disregard
reluctance to impose the defense in an employment context
because library staff enjoy no extra financial benefit from sexu-
al commodificationY. l Thus, an assumption of risk defense
should fail against library staff who charge sexual harassment
when clients expose them to Internet pornography.
IV. WHAT'S A LIBRARY TO Do?: ADEQUATE PREEMPTIVE AND
REMEDIAL AcTION
Even in the face of a viable hostile work environment
claim based on client display of Internet pornography to staff,
there are measures that public library employers, like all other
employers, can take to significantly reduce the likelihood of
liability.2 This is especially true in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Faragher and Burlington. In both
cases the Court outlined a new afirmative defense for employ-
ers who can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
they instituted anti-harassment policies and procedures and
that the employee failed to take adequate advantage of these
protections.28 Whether this affirmative defense will be avail-
able in third-party claims remains to be seen since it was only
put forth by the Court in the context of supervisory harass-
ment. However, it is likely that a public library employer's
showing of appropriate remedial action will avoid liability.'
228 See supra notes 260-269 and accompanying text.
o See supra notes 260-278 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 273-278 and accompanying text.
282 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1980) (requiring plaintiff bringing hostile work
environment claim to show a failure to take remedial action).
28 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
28 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e); cf Carey, supra note 26, at 70 (explaining that
although the new affirmative defense was established by the Supreme Court in
only the supervisory harassment contexts of Faragher and Burlington, it is "likely"
the defense "would be available to the employer in a case of co-worker harassment
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The key features that courts look for in appropriate reme-
dial action include swiftness285 and reasonable calculation to
effectively combat the type of harassment indicated." Rela-
tive levels of swiftness and effectiveness are determined as a
function of the nature and severity of the harassment it-
self." It is well recognized that a preemptive company policy
against sexual harassment which outlines that harassment is
not condoned and that remedial action will be imposed on
violators can go a long way toward convincing a court of a
company's dedication to reasonably calculated remedies.'
However, a preemptive policy in and of itself will not insulate
any employer entirely. 9 For example, courts have said that
at [sic] well").
2 See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 27, at *33 ("[Clorrective action must be
'prompt.' The meaning of 'prompt,' however, will vary with the conditions of em-
ployment as well as the severity of the offense."). "Clownish, boorish" conduct will
generally require less prompt action than "aggressive coercive harassment" judged
by a reasonableness standard. Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 27, at *33-*34 (cit-
ing Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987)).
' See, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"a jury could reasonably conclude" that a Sheriffs Department employer's "tepid
response" to harassment "did not effectively remedy the harassment problem" and
thus reversing summary judgment for Sheriffs Department where supervisor sug-
gested that the harasser and target "kiss and make up,'" separated the target and
harasser, and reassigned the target to "less desirable duty"); see also Kaplowitz &
Harris, supra note 51, at *36 ("[Clases stress that an employer should take action.
However, the employer must show the effectiveness of the action, not merely that
action is taken. Prompt action that is not reasonably likely to prevent the miscon-
duct is ineffective ... ineffective action is equal to no action.").
28 See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 27, at *33-*34.
288 See Scott F. Uhler & Rinda Y. Allison, A 10-Step Program: Reducing the
Likelihood of Sexual Harassment and the Possibility of Successful Sexual Harass-
ment Lawsuits, ILL. LIBR., Spring 1997, at 65.
2 See, e.g., Ligenza v. Genesis Health Ventures, 995 F. Supp. 226, 231 (D.
Mass. 1998) (finding that although employer had a sexual harassment policy, the
policy provided inadequate protection to employees where it consisted of "a single
line" in an "Employment Policy Statement and indicate[d] that an individual, be-
lieving him or herself to have been harassed, may file a complaint which will be
investigated by the Regional Director"). The Ligenza court further noted that "[tihe
Supreme Court has refused to guarantee safe harbor to every employer that pro-
vides a grievance procedure and policy against discrimination where the complain-
ing employee failed to invoke that procedure." Id. (citing Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)); see also Praprotnik v. St. Louis, 485 U.S. 112
(1988) (protection from liability will not apply if anti-harassment policy is ignored);
Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998) (attaching liabili-
ty to employer where manager forced a waitress to serve customers who then
sexually assualted her and of whom she had complained had previously subjected
her to rude behavior instead of following Pizza Hut's sexual harassment policy by
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such a policy, even if well executed, will not insulate an em-
ployer from liability if it is disseminated in such a fashion that
it is not widely read."
More important than merely instituting general policies,
the public library employer must swiftly and effectively re-
spond to actual harassment problems as they arise in the li-
brary. Responding to actual incidents of harassment means
responding to both individual complaints and to evidence of a
problem even if it has yet to be the subject of complaint."'
Library employers will be responsible for pervasive harassment
of which they should have been awareY2 This means that
library employers who have been reluctant to recognize both
that public libraries currently suffer an increasing problem
with all kinds of third-party sexual harassment293 and that
public libraries are suffering increasing incidents of third-party
harassment involving the use of Internet sexual content,2"
must now acknowledge these problems. Acknowledgment and
intolerance of third-party harassment problems should be inte-
grated into any current anti-harassment policies and mea-
sures. Where anti-harassment policies or measures do not yet
exist, library employers must create them. Further, libraries
must begin to actively investigate both reported and unre-
ported problems or risk facing increased liability. Once a li-
asking the customers to desist such behavior or to leave the restaurant); Uhler &
Allison, supra note 277, at 65 (citing Praprotnik).
'o See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 112.
"' See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1980) (stating that employer may be liable for
harassment if it should have been aware of harassment even where not actually
apprised by a complaint). The Lockard case presents a strong warning to employ-
ers. In that case, the Third Circuit attached liability to the employer who had
received complaints of rude behavior and a hair pulling incident by two customers
from a waitress and three requests that she not serve those customers. See
Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1074-75. Although the waitress did not specify that the cus-
tomers had also subjected her to crude, sexual comments, the court found that the
employer should have had the requisite knowledge and been put on notice to en-
act measures specified in the restaurant's sexual harassment policy instead of
forcing her to serve the customers resulting in a sexual assault. See id. The
Lockard decision suggests that courts will require employers to be more proactive
in enacting anti-harassment measures even where the employer may not be fully
apprised of the extent or nature of the harassment.
29 See Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1074-75.
"' See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing library reluctance
to admit all forms of sexual harassment of staff by clients).
2,4 See supra notes 84, 95-103, 105-109 and accompanying text.
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brary has knowledge of any sort of harassment involving
Internet sexual content, it must take swift, effective
remedial action. 5
There are at least three measures which, used in combina-
tion, should prove effective in combatting third-party harass-
ment in libraries due to Internet sexual content display, in-
cluding privacy screens, individual printers, and ejection of
client violators. Privacy screens, while not 100% effective in
preventing a client's ability to flash Internet sexual content to
staff, have been shown in libraries to significantly reduce the
ease with which clients may accomplish harassmentY6 They
will not, for example, solve the problem of clients such as the
"Coat Man" who, under the guise of requesting assistance with
an Internet problem, lure staff into a situation where staff are
forced to focus attention on a computer screen even if the
screen is equipped with a privacy screen.29 Installation of
printers attached to each computer terminal may also reduce
the instance of client pornography being sent to central print-
ers typically operated by staff."8 However, neither of these
measures will fully eradicate a problem in the face of particu-
larly dedicated harassers, such as the "Coat Man."299 Further,
in light of well publicized budget problems in recent years,
many public library systems are ill-equipped financially to
afford such expensive measures."' Where these measures
prove ineffective or unaffordable, public libraries should rely
on swift client ejections from the library, perhaps permanently,
to reduce the likelihood of liability for the harassment. Under
Kreimer and the secondary effects doctrine, libraries should no
longer feel reluctant to eject clients from libraries in the face of
2 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e).
296 See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 8, at 60-62 (discussing measures such as pri-
vacy screens and noting that all measures are "flawed"). See generally Reports of
Pornography, supra note 3 (noting in some complaint instances that once privacy
screens were installed in the branch, the client pornography display problems
seemed to dissipate considerably).
2," See supra note 96 and accompanying text (detailing the "Coat Man" incident
for which a privacy screen would offer no protection to staff lured into gazing at
the harasser's screen).
2,, See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
299 Reports of Pornography, supra note 3.
" See, e.g., Conference Draws Record Crowd, AM. LIBR., July 1, 1995, at 654
("A [library] crisis communications plan is also de riguer to cope with such 'all-too-
familiar' plights as budget cuts .... ").
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unpleasant or violent client behavior such as sexual harass-
ment.3"' After Kreimer, it is unlikely that a client will be
allowed to assert a First Amendment right to remain in a
library once that client is notified of possible Title VII viola-
tions based on inappropriate use of the Internet and of the
library's intent to eject clients to enforce its anti-harassment
policy if that client persists in deliberate harassment of staff in
violation of federal anti-discrimination laws." 2
CONCLUSION
The great benefit of progressive sexual harassment law is
perhaps not its ability to redress wrongs suffered by individual
victims financially, although that is an important remedy, but
rather its ability to force employers to adopt policies and atti-
tudes that slowly transform workplaces into equal environ-
ments for all."0 ' Some of the courts' sexual harassment stan-
dards discussed here are in flux and remain unfavorable to the
acceptance of a claim based on the types of circumstances
resulting from client Internet use that a library staff claimant
would likely present. However, none of the issues raised within
this Note prove a death knell to such a claim. Individual courts
may disagree about whether pornography alone is sufficiently
severe to sustain a harassment claim, or whether a more pro-
plaintiff reasonable woman standard should apply. However, it
remains that courts have found for plaintiffs on each of the
individual factual circumstances outlined here that, when
combined, would make up a prototypical library staff hostile
environment claim based on client display of Internet pornog-
raphy. Thus, because there is evidence of a problem with staff
harassment due to client Internet pornography displays, and
because courts are increasingly accepting the sufficiency of the
801 See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (1993). See generally Philip
J. Morin, Comment, Why Kreimer Can't Read: Striking the Proper Balance Between
Library Access and Problem Patrons in Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 46 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1845 (1994).
302 See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
3 3 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998) ("Title
VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective
grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer's
effort to create such procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to promote
conciliation rather than litigation ....- ).
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factual circumstances that make up this problem in order to
sustain a sexual harassment claim, public library employers
should heed this warning as an opportunity to acknowledge
the problem of Internet exposure to pornography and all sexual
harassment in their workplaces. Further, public libraries
should begin now, without fear that the First Amendment
could be used as a weapon to condemn their actions, to inte-
grate preventive measures and remedial policies geared toward
combatting Internet harassment into their ordinary anti-sexual
harassment campaigns.
Kim Houghton*
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